Barriers to Nonviolent Resistance:

Identities, Aims and

State Responses to Dissent

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Abstract

The second chapter of this PhD thesis examines the barriers to nonviolent resistance and explains why, despite the grievances, we see uprisings in some states and not others. I argue that a lack of common ties and the existence of ethnic cleavages create additional barriers for nonviolent mass mobilization in ethnically diverse states. I test the argument by using the Ethnic-Power Relations (EPR) and Nonviolent and Violent Campaign and Outcomes (NAVCO.2.0) datasets. The results show that the probability of nonviolent campaign onset is conditional on both, the levels of ethnic diversity and the regime type – the onset being less likely in ethnically diverse non-democracies. The third chapter illustrates how ethnic divides can be used to undermine mass-scale nonviolent mobilization by examining government framing of protest events during the 2014 spring protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Automated text analysis approach is used to discover the types of narratives (frames) that the Bosnia and Herzegovina's government officials used to respond to protest demands. The results show that the Government officials have predominantly used the following types of frames: delegitimizing (ex. calling protesters traitors, hooligans), demobilizing (sympathetic statements – ex. saying that protests are justified), and alternative views (sidelining/ignoring grievances by discussing more salient issues). The results indicate that ethnic divides were exploited to prevent cross-ethnic mass mobilization. In the chapter four, I explore the variability of government responses to protest events using the Mass Mobilization Data (MMD), focusing on the ignore category - the response not commonly studied in the literature. I find that contrary to the expectations, governments are more likely to ignore than repress protest events. In particular, governments are more likely to

ignore protests with 1000 or more participants, and more likely to accommodate than repress protests above 5000 participants. In conclusion, this PhD thesis shows that ethnicity increases costs of cooperation and lowers potentials for nonviolent resistance. In addition, this thesis demonstrates that governments might often choose to neither repress nor accommodate protest events, choosing instead to ignore grievances and demands. In summary, the aim of this PhD thesis is to examine barriers to nonviolent resistance and state responses to dissent.

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If you can't fly, run; if you can't run, walk; if you can't walk, crawl; but by all means keep moving. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr, Address at Spelman College, 10th of April 1960

Chapter 1

Introduction

People are the core of any collective action. *People power* has been an important instrument of social and political change. This term was coined to describe the anti-regime protests in the Philippines when millions of people took to the streets to overthrow President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 (Ackerman and DuVall 2005). Many oppressive, corrupt and ineffective governments around the globe have been toppled by unarmed, ordinary people seeking to challenge and change conditions in their communities. These developments have led to an increase in scholarly interest in nonviolent resistance and collective action dilemmas.

Individuals who engage in a civil resistance against a state often do so at a great personal risk. Protest participants face repressive and unyielding regimes that resort to violence to suppress uprisings. In addition to physical repression, protesters often encounter discrediting and undermining rhetoric or are repeatedly ignored by those in power (Bishara 2015). Protesters also face numerous organizational barriers and collective action dilemmas that limit their ability to mobilize against a regime. Collective action dilemmas range from rational self-interest (Olson 2009), to a broader consideration of group goals, collective responsibility and wider societal security. This thesis focuses on identity related barriers, such as ethnicity, that affect

the emergence of collective nonviolent resistance campaigns. The thesis also examines a variety of state responses to dissent.

Collective campaigns consist of "*time and space-bounded sets of activities oriented toward the same goal*" (Marwell and Oliver 1984, p.1). Unity of opinions and strategies as well as a large number of highly motivated participants is needed to initiate a collective civil resistance campaign against a regime. In order to develop a common understanding of grievances and goals and mobilize large numbers, protesters cross existing political, social and cultural boundaries to garner more support for their cause (Smith et al 2015). Those who voluntarily come together to act on a behalf of a larger collective do so either because they identify with an aggrieved social group, with a group's goal, or in some cases, with both (Klandermans 1999). A sense of unity and common purpose facilitates coordination, cooperation and commitment needed to initiate nonviolent uprisings and successfully resist a more powerful regime apparatus. The second and the third chapter of this thesis explore the conditions that affect potential for nonviolent resistance.

The second chapter of this thesis examines the effects of ethnic boundaries on nonviolent campaign initiation in a cross-country sample of 109 large-scale nonviolent campaigns, using the information on campaigns collected by Chenoweth and Stephan (2011). The data used in this chapter is described in section 1.2 Overview of Research Chapters: Datasets and Findings. I rely on the definitions of Day et al.(2014, p.1) and Chenoweth and Lewis (2013, p.417) to define a nonviolent campaign a set of civilian-led, nonviolent, coordinated and purposive actions and events, involving 1000 or more participants. I focus on this type of anti-regime action as it requires a great deal of coordination and strategic decision-making by campaign organizers and participants.

Common ethnic ties facilitate collective action as ethnic groups provide informal social institutions that promote solidarity, common interests and aims (Humphreys et al. 2002). Members of an ethnic group might find it easier to coordinate and interact with those who belong to their ethnic group and utilize their commonalities to overcome collective action dilemmas and barriers. On the contrary, in cases where ethnic divides are present, people may lack a motivation to join others in an active struggle against a state regardless of the grievances and injustices that a regime imposes on its citizens. Thus, the aim of the second chapter is to examine the role of ethnicity as a potential barrier for nonviolent campaign initiation.

The third chapter of this thesis explores how ethnic divides can be used by government officials to undermine nonviolent mobilization. The case of 2014 spring protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) provides insights into the Government's framing of protesters' grievances and goals, and the potential effects that framing can have on protest mobilization. The dataset used in this chapter was collected as described in section 1.2 Overview of Research Chapters; Datasets and Findings. In this chapter I aim to accomplish the following: 1) explore the Government's framing of protest events using automated text analysis tools, 2) propose a categorization of government frames – something that is missing in the current literature on state responses to protest events, and 3) discuss potential effects of government framing on protest participation. The discussion regarding the relationship between government frames and mobilization levels is based on the exploratory rather than confirmatory analyses. The primary aim of this chapter is to uncover the types of discourses surrounding protest events (topics/frames) and propose a categorisation of government frames.

The case of B&H is useful to study government framing of protest events given the ethnic divides and difficult economic conditions that have persisted since the end of the 1990s conflict. It seemed for a moment that political and ethnic divides in B&H had vanished as a group of protesters took to the streets chanting "*we are hungry in three languages*"[1]suggesting that years of corruption have equally impoverished Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and others (Mackey 2014). Yet, despite the equally difficult economic situation in all parts of the country, with an unemployment rate of over 40%, the protests were mainly attended and organized by Bosniaks and Croats, while Serbs were largely absent from most protest events (Bjelajac 2014). Fear of domination by other ethnic group/s is still present in B&H where social and political life is largely organized along ethnic lines, preventing individuals from engaging across ethnic boundaries to address common grievances. Each ethnic group is a dominant majority in their entity (and/or canton) and a fear of losing that power and level of political and cultural autonomy might have prevented cross-ethnic protest action. The idea of majority nationalism (Loizides 2015) appears to drive these groups to compete to achieve larger sovereignty and greater control over the territory long after the end of the 1990s ethnic war.

In divided and unequal societies, groups and individuals often become pitted against each other, constructing an image of *self* and *other* that ultimately minimizes and paralyzes their ability to effectively resolve issues at hand (Buskens et al. 2008;

[1] Before the ethnic conflict in 1990s the official language in Yugoslavia and all its republics, B&H included, was called Serbo-Croatian. These two languages existed separately prior to the establishment of the Yugoslav Federation, but with the unification of Yugoslavia after the WWII, the language was referred to as Serbo-Croatian. After the conflict was over in B&H, Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) have sought to define their own language, naming it Bosniak/Bosnian. Bosnian Serbs reverted to calling their language Serbian, and Croats calling theirs Croatian. There are slight linguistic differences that emerged over time, but in actuality the three languages are interchangeable. So what protesters are saying here when they are saying that "they are hungry in three languages", they are saying – ethnic differences, language differences and divides do not matter – what matters is that they are all equally impoverished by the corrupt and ineffective leadership by the Bosniak, Croat and Serb politicians.

Dojčinović 2012).[2] Some B&H government officials have exploited ethnic divides to undermine the 2014 protest events by claiming that the protests were a ploy by other ethnic group/s to seize power and destabilize the country (Oslobodjenje 2014.b). The case of B&H illustrates the challenges that come with initiating nonviolent anti-regime campaigns in ethnically diverse societies.

The case of B&H also provides insights into the Government's use of dismissive and discrediting rhetoric as an alternative to physical acts of repression. In addition, the rhetorical alternatives to acts of accommodation such sympathetic statements made by some of the B&H officials are also examined. In relation to the B&H regime's choice to ignore protest demands (no repression and no accommodation), I suggest that sidelining the main causes of grievances by proposing an alternative interpretation of issues and events closely corresponds to the acts of ignoring protests. I propose the following government frames categories: delegitimizing (ex. traitors), demobilizing (sympathetic statements), and alternative views (sidelining/ignoring grievances). The variability in government responses to protest events is closely examined in the fourth chapter of this dissertation, including the choice to ignore protest demands which is rarely studied in the current protest literature.

The fourth chapter provides a systematic empirical analysis of government responses to protest events in a cross-national sample of 161 independent states, using a dataset collected by Clark and Reagan (2016). The data used in this chapter is described in section 1.2 Overview of Research Chapters: Datasets and Findings.

[2] č – *ch* pronounced as in *Charlie*, ć –*tch* pronounced as in witch .

When faced with dissent, regimes seek to employ the least costly and most effective ways to respond to protest related threats. As some protests are more threatening than others, regimes' responses are likely to vary. Even so, numerous studies have primarily focused on repression (Tilly 1978; Gurr 1986; Davenport 2000; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Hendrix and Salehyan 2016). Davenport (2007) firmly claims that repression is an expected response to protests and suggests that the relationship is the most consistent finding in the protest literature – coining it the *Law of Coercive Responsiveness*. If repression is to be expected, then a fear of violence and a lack of trust in government will lower people's expectations that a change is possible through protests (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans, p.4). This type of claim could shape a policy debate and encourage governments to pass more restrictive and repressive measures to prevent dissent. In such cases government repression can present another major barrier for nonviolent mass mobilization. Thus, it is important to examine and evaluate if and how the *Law of Coercive Responsiveness* helps explain governments' actions towards protesters. Other researchers take a less definite stand and propose that repression increases with an increase in threat levels, referring to this view as a *threat-response* theory (Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003). The fourth chapter contributes to the current literature as it broadens the theoretical discussion on what constitutes a threat by incorporating a state's choice to ignore or accommodate protests in addition to their use of repression.

The *threat-response* theory suggests that the probability of repression increases/decreases relative to protest threat levels (Tilly, 1978; Gartner and Regan 1996; Poe et al 2000; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003). This theoretical framework opens the avenues for other types of government responses to be taken into

consideration. What do governments do when *protest threats* are low? Is it in a regime's best interest to primarily rely on repression to reduce threat to its power? These and similar questions are addressed in the fourth chapter in detail.

Repression is not the only available choice that regimes can use to respond to dissent – protests can be also ignored and/or accommodated (Klein and Regan forthcoming). The ignore category, in particular, has been greatly overlooked in the current protest literature. I take both, the accommodation and the ignore category into consideration and examine these in the context of the *threat-response* theory. Overall, the primary aim of the fourth chapter is to contribute to the current literature on dissent by evaluating how protest event attributes such as protest size and demands shape a government's perceived levels of threat and a choice to ignore, accommodate or repress protest events.

The following section provides a more detailed discussion of protest attributes and government responses.

1.1 Protest Attributes and Government Responses

Grievances such as social and political injustices, regimes' repressive and discriminatory policies or economic strife are often cited as a source of unrest. Some protests emerge as spontaneous reactions to injustices, while others are a part of a larger, strategic, purposive, long-lasting and well-organized anti-government campaign. Anti-regime uprisings that develop goal-oriented, strategic and coordinated actions are better equipped to demand and succeed in their calls for policy change, regime reform, or even regime removal. The second chapter focuses on the emergence of these types of events – large-scale, organized and purposive

nonviolent campaigns. Nonviolent campaigns link various campaign events (individual protests and less visible actions such as planning during winter months) to capture ongoing, purposive and organized efforts to confront a regime (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). The third chapter of this thesis examines government responses (framing/rhetoric) to much smaller, less organized and primarily spontaneous protest events. The data used in the fourth chapter includes both, small and large-scale protest events, with a semi-organized structure, placing this data somewhere in the middle between the large-scale nonviolent campaigns and small-scale spontaneous events. Thus, this thesis examines a diverse set of protest events that vary in the terms of their organizational level.

In order to effectively oppose a more powerful regime apparatus, protest activists need to be able to mobilize a large number of highly motivated individuals who can articulate their demands in a clear manner. The larger the protest size and the more demanding the claims are, the more likely the regime will take notice and seek ways to undermine and quash uprisings. Protest participation levels and the types of demands shape governments' perceived levels of threat and a choice to repress, accommodate or ignore calls for a change.

Government responses to protest events exemplify people's struggle over the rights and access to political power. The current protest literature provides some insights into a regime's use of repression towards protests that pose a higher level of threat, but it greatly overlooks the possible use of other types of responses. In particular, the conditions that underlie a state's choice to ignore dissent are largely left unexplored and unexplained in the current protest literature.

While motives for uprisings are numerous, in particular in non-democratic states, a presence of ethnic cleavages may greatly affect the level of cohesiveness and

cooperation needed for nonviolent mass mobilization. In cases where salient ethnic cleavages heighten the inherent societal distance that already exists in repressive states, the possibility of nonviolent collective action may decrease. Nonviolent protests may fail to emerge for numerous reasons. The second and third chapter of this thesis suggests that nonviolent campaigns or small-scale peaceful protests do not emerge as often in some states, despite high levels of grievances, because ethnic divides affect levels of cooperation and coordination across various ethnic groups. Thus, a common understanding of grievances and goals can help people to overcome collective action barriers and demonstrate *people power* in ways that could be beneficial for a larger collective.

The following sections provide a more detailed overview of research chapters; the datasets and the findings. This section is followed by a brief thesis outline.

1.2 Overview of Research Chapters: Datasets and Findings

The second chapter addresses the question of people being more or less willing to join others in a nonviolent, collective struggle against a state and to what extent ethnic ties affect their decision to participate in an uprising. The reasoning behind this question stems from conflict and economics literature. Conflict literature often links ethnicity, in particular, salient ethnic divides and violent conflict (Posner 2004; Cederman et al. 2010; Gubler and Selway 2012; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013). Economics literature suggests that ethnic diversity makes it more difficult to achieve collective action and produce collective goods (see, e.g., Alesina and LaFerrara 2005). There also appears to be a lower level of trust and participation in ethnically diverse societies, and so, a sense of shared struggles may be more present in ethnically

homogenous societies, where common identity facilitates unity and motivates people to engage in collective action (Putnam, 2007; Posner, 2004; Alesina and LaFerrara, 2000).

Much of the focus in the literature on ethnicity has been on the relationship between ethnicity and violent conflict, and less so on the relationship of between ethnicity and nonviolent uprisings. Thus, given the potential role that ethnicity may play in political organization, the second chapter contributes to the current literature on dissent by testing ethnicity related propositions in relation to the onset of nonviolent campaigns.

The findings in the second chapter indicate that the negative effect of ethnicity on the onset of nonviolent campaigns is conditional on the regime type, with the probability of an onset being least likely in ethnically diverse non-democracies. Ethnicity alone does not represent a significant barrier for nonviolent campaign onset, however, in non-democratic regimes, where rights are limited and groups are pitted against each other, ethnicity becomes a barrier.

The second chapter utilizes the Nonviolent and Violent Campaign and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) dataset, with a primary focus on the onset of nonviolent campaigns during 1945-2006 (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). The advantage of the NAVCO 2.0 dataset is that it provides an opportunity to study large-scale, coordinated campaigns against a government that involve 1000 or more people. These types of large-scale, sustained nonviolent campaigns are likely to involve individuals from various societal groups. Chenoweth and Lewis report (2013) that the majority of the NAVCO 2.0 campaigns are ethnically diverse (p.421). Cooperation across a diverse set of individuals is an important prerequisite for a broad-based nonviolent resistance

campaign. Thus, this dataset is well suited to examine the emergence of nonviolent collective action and the effects of ethnic diversity on these types of events.

While the NAVCO 2.0 dataset provides extensive and useful information on campaign characteristics, it lacks detailed information on government responses to uprisings. The NAVCO 2.0 dataset codes a government's use of repression, but from the perspective of the opposition campaign and not a state (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). It also codes the government response as a dichotomous variable, yes – no repression; a state's use of repression versus a combination of a state not responding and/or state conceding. Thus, this data is not suitable for examining variability in state responses to nonviolent anti-regime campaigns, which is the aim of the fourth chapter of this thesis. The other disadvantage of the NAVCO 2.0 dataset is that it does not code periods of lower level contention that precedes the onset of nonviolent campaigns with 1000 or more participants. Thus, using the NAVCO2.0 dataset it is not possible to examine if and how government responses to smaller-scale protest events may present a barrier for nonviolent campaign initiation. Information that is not present in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset is coded in the Mass Mobilization Data (MMD data; Clark and Regan 2016; for detailed discussion see Klein and Regan, forthcoming). The MMD data is used in the fourth chapter to further examine the relationship between protest characteristics and government responses.

The primary contribution of the second chapter is to offer insight into the effects of ethnicity on nonviolent conflict. Another important contribution of the second chapter is the use of Ethnic-Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman et al. 2010) to estimate the levels of ethnic diversity while taking into account the salience of ethnic categories. The EPR dataset provides more precise and up-to date information on 758 ethnic groups, their power relations and access to state power

(monopoly or exclusion) for all relevant groups in 157 countries between 1946-2014 (Cederman et al. 2010, p.14; Vogt et al. 2015). The EPR dataset has been proven to offer a more suitable measure of ethnic diversity as it captures the salience of ethnic categories. While some earlier studies have primarily relied on demographic characteristics to test a relationship between ethnicity and conflict occurrence (see Posner 2004 for a detailed review), the recent works suggest that ethnicity may matter more when, for instance, large portions of the population are excluded from power sharing on the basis of ethnic belonging (see, e.g.,Wimmer et al. 2009; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013).

The third chapter examines the rhetoric and the language (framing) that regime officials use to respond to protest events. The protest framing literature defines frames as strategic, simple and meaningful ideas, developed and deployed to achieve a specific purpose (Snow and Benford 1988; Benford and Snow 2000, p.624). The protest framing literature has developed an extensive scholarly work on the framing processes, but primarily from the protest activists' perspective. The frames proposed by government officials are rarely explored in social movement and government response literature. The findings in this chapter show that the government officials in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) engaged in strategic framing of protest events relying on the following frames: delegitimizing (ex. calling protesters traitors, hooligans), demobilizing (sympathetic statements – ex. saying that protests are justified), and alternative views (sidelining/ignoring grievances by discussing more salient issues). This chapter contributes to the literature by examining government framing of protest events and proposing a categorization of government frames.

The analysis in this chapter focuses on the case of the B&H 2014 spring protests and the Government officials' verbal responses to these events. Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) is an example of a country where political and social life is largely divided along ethnic lines. Territorial and ethnic divides present a barrier for greater cross-ethnic cooperation. After the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) the country was divided into 3 administrative units: Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H), Republic of Srpska (RS) and Brčko District (BD). The FB&H is mainly inhabited by Bosnian Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, while the RS is mainly inhabited by Bosnian Serbs (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014). Ethnic divides, post-conflict issues and the DPA bureaucratic structures have negatively affected economic recovery, with estimates that every 6th citizen in B&H is living below the poverty line (Dedic 2013; p.2; Ceriani and Ruggeri 2015). Regardless of the high levels of economic grievances, anti-regime protests on a national or cross-entity level are rare.

The 2014 spring protests were the largest mobilization of people since the end of the 1990s conflict. Even so, the protests primarily emerged in the FB&H and did not spill over to the RS entity. The differences in the framing by the FB&H and the RS officials could help explain the differences in the levels of mobilization in the two entities. The findings show that the FB&H political leaders have used both sympathizing and delegitimizing frames, while the RS government mainly framed the protests as a threat to the RS autonomy. The RS government's strategy to evoke a more salient issue such as the RS autonomy may help explain why Bosnian Serbs did not join Bosnian Bosniaks and Croats to address grave economic and political conditions in the country.

The methods that I have used to study government frames are exploratory rather than confirmatory, and so the relationship between government frames and mobilization levels is primarily explored in descriptive terms. The primary aim of this chapter was to categorize government frames given the lack of attention in the current literature regarding the government's verbal response to protest events. I have relied on automated text analysis, structural topic modelling methods, to *discover* framing structures and the language used by the Government officials to respond to protests.

I extracted the data from the INFOBIRO, the first, the only and the most extensive digital database of all B&H news reports over the last 50 years (INFOBIRO 2015). I manually downloaded all the articles that were published from January to April 2014 using regular expressions to identify protest related articles. I focused on the major daily B&H newspaper sources, *Oslobodjenje* and *Nezavisne Novine*. I manually reviewed all the articles and decided to only include news articles from the month of February (N=863) given that protests in other months were rare. Belgioioso, Gleditsch and Vidović (2017) also found that the protests primarily emerged in the month of February, and their dataset includes a wider range of sources, including international sources and video recordings posted by activists online. The analysis was then performed using automated text analysis methods developed by Roberts et al.(2015). One of the advantages of this dataset (corpus of text) is that it contains information based on local sources, *Oslobodjenje* is based in the FB&H entity, and *Nezavisne Novine* is based in the RS. The disadvantages that come with using local news sources is that it presents a challenge to verify the findings (compare human coding of text to automated text analysis). In addition, it presents additional technical challenges as most automated text analysis models are

developed and tested using English language sets of texts. However, this is becoming less of a challenge with political scientists developing language specific algorithms.

The final analysis chapter in this thesis, chapter four, explores the variability in government responses to protest events. The main aim of the chapter is to explore conditions that underlie a government's choice to respond to protests either by repressing, accommodating or ignoring uprisings. The rationale and the motivation for this question stems from the realization that the current literature on dissent primarily focuses on the use of repression, and disregards other types of responses, in particular the ignore category.

The findings in this chapter indicate that contrary to the expectations and the *Law of Coercive Responsiveness* claims, the ignore option is the most common government response. The idea that repression is the dominant strategy is not supported by the results in this study. The results in this chapter also show that the probability of ignoring increases as the protest size increases, contradicting another view in the literature, the *threat-response* theory, which states that repression increases with an increase in threat levels (increase in the number of protest participants).

I was able to conduct the analyses described in the fourth chapter of this thesis by relying on the Mass Mobilization Data (MMD), the first and only dataset that codes several types of government responses (Clark and Reagan 2016). The MMD provides information on protest events and government responses for 161 countries between 1990-2014.

There are several advantages to using the MMD to study government responses. First, the MMD codes independent protest events with a threshold of 50 participants, which allows me to examine whether and how governments respond to

smaller-scale protest events with fewer than 1000 participants (NAVCO 2.0 threshold). This is helpful for understanding if and how government responses present a barrier for an emergence of larger, coordinated and sustained efforts of civil resistance (types of events studied in the Chapter 2). The MMD data also codes large-scale protest events (10 000 and above), which helps me examine governments' perceptions of threat levels and their choice of action when responding to small versus large-scale protest events.

The one disadvantage of the MMD data is the coding of the protest violence variable. The MMD codes protesters engaging in violence as a dichotomous variable, with one being any type of violence from riots to destruction of property to shooting at the police (Clark and Regan 2016). As I am primarily interested in strategic nonviolent mobilization (both small and large-scale mobilization levels), it would have been useful to have information if the use of violence was strategic on the part of the protesters or if the violence was instigated by provocateurs not associated with the protest campaign. I deal with this disadvantage of the data by controlling for *protest violence* since a regime is more likely repress violent protests. Overall, the MMD data provides a useful framework for examining variety of government responses and further testing of the dominant theoretical frameworks such as the *Law of Coercive Responsiveness* and the *threat-response* theory.

1.3 The PhD Thesis Outline

The second chapter explores how and to what extent ethnic divisions affect potentials for nonviolent mass mobilization. The findings confirm that ethnicity presents a barrier for nonviolent mass mobilization in non-democratic states, with the probability of the onset of nonviolent campaigns being least likely in ethnically

diverse non-democracies. The third chapter focuses on investigating ways in which ethnic divides can be exploited by government officials who aim to undermine dissent. The findings illustrate that the existence of ethnic divides during the 2014 protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina played a role in the Government's framing of protest events in this case. The fourth chapter extends the current literature on dissent by examining variability in government responses, and finds that contrary to the expectation, governments are more likely to ignore than repress or accommodate protests. In the final chapter, the conclusion, I discuss the implications of my findings and provide recommendations for the future research.

Chapter 2

Divided We Fall: Ethnic Diversity and Obstacles to Nonviolent Mobilization

The chapter is co-authored with Prof Kristian Skrede Gleditsch

Abstract

Are people more or less willing to collectivise on the basis of ethnic ties? While collective action dilemmas exist in both, ethnically homogenous and heterogeneous societies, the obstacles to nonviolent mass mobilization differ. We argue that a lack of common ties and the existence of ethnic cleavages create additional barriers for nonviolent mass mobilization in ethnically diverse states. Salient ethnic cleavages can negatively affect levels of cooperation and coordination and lower potentials for nonviolent resistance. Ethnicity has been primarily studied with regard to violent conflict and rarely considered in relation to nonviolent uprisings. This chapter examines the effects of ethnicity on nonviolent campaign initiation by using the Ethnic-Power Relations (EPR, 1946-2014) and Nonviolent and Violent Campaign and Outcomes (NAVCO.2.0, 1945-2006) datasets. Our results show that the probability of nonviolent campaign onset is conditional on both, the levels of ethnic diversity and the regime type. The findings support our main argument that the nonviolent campaign onset is less likely in ethnically diverse non-democracies. This chapter provides theoretical and empirical contributions to the current literature on nonviolent resistance by taking into account ethnic group relations and examine how these affect potentials for the emergence of nonviolent campaigns.

2. 1 Introduction

As workers, church leaders and elites joined their forces to peacefully resist Communist rule in Poland and other neighbouring states in 1980s, anti-Communist resistance in Yugoslavia was lacking. Nonviolent mass demonstrations in ethnically homogenous Poland and Hungary led to the collapse of Communist rule and democratic transition. In contrast, limited calls for political pluralism in multiethnic Yugoslavia (Cox 2004) evoked ethnic grievances and nationalist political agendas that led to breakup of the country and eventually civil war in several of its republics. Did common ethnic ties facilitate greater solidarity and coordination among the members of the Polish nonviolent resistance movement? Is it easier to solve collective action dilemmas in ethnically homogenous societies in comparison to ethnically heterogeneous societies? We argue that ethnic groups provide informal social institutions that facilitate collective action by promoting solidarity, common interests and aims (Humphreys et al. 2002). On the contrary, a lack of common ties and the existence of ethnic cleavages create additional barriers for nonviolent mass mobilization in ethnically diverse states. Salient ethnic cleavages can negatively affect levels of cooperation and coordination and, thus, lower potentials for nonviolent resistance.

We test our argument empirically by using the Nonviolent and Violent Campaign and Outcomes (NAVCO 2.0) dataset from which we extract information on the onset of nonviolent campaigns during 1945-2006 (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). We also use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset to obtain a measure of ethnic diversity that best captures the ethnic power relations between relevant ethnic groups during 1946-2014 (Cederman et al. 2010, p.14; Vogt et al. 2015). To authors'

knowledge, this is the first paper that considers ethnicity as a potential barrier for nonviolent campaign initiation.

Public gatherings and protest marches are the most common civil resistance tactics used to publicly and openly express grievances and demands against a government. Protest events can be characterized as nonviolent, violent or a mixture of both. The focus of this chapter is on nonviolent uprisings. In particular, we focus on the emergence of nonviolent campaigns that require coordinated and persistent efforts and involve large numbers of people. These types of events are likely to involve individuals from various societal groups. Thus, by examining large-scale nonviolent uprisings coded in NAVACO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), we are able to test to what extent ethnic diversity affects coordination, cooperation and commitment needed for the emergence of large-scale nonviolent campaigns. The term *nonviolent campaign* refers to a set of civilian-led, nonviolent, coordinated and purposive actions, initiated by unarmed persons who have chosen to engage in an active struggle against a state (Day et. al 2014, p.1).

Protests often emerge as a rallying call against oppression, corruption and poverty in a society. People join protest events either when they identify with an aggrieved social group, with groups' demands, or in some cases with both (Klandermans 1999). Studies have shown that people are more likely to support an action against a government if they share a common and psychologically meaningful bond with others (see Thomas et al. 2009, p.196; Humphreys et al. 2002, for a detailed review). When people relate to each other and share a common vision, they are more likely to join a campaign, and subsequently, more likely to succeed by confronting a regime in masses.

Ethnicity plays a relevant role in political organization. Members of ethnic groups relate through linguistic, religious or cultural norms and often rely on groups' informal social institutions to coordinate their actions (Humphreys et al. 2002). Common ethnic ties enhance coordination and goal-oriented struggle, which are the pre-requisite for nonviolent campaign emergence. While political psychology literature demonstrates that social identities play an important role in collective action (Smith et al 2014; Thomas and Louis 2013; McGarty et al. 2014), ethnicity related propositions are yet to be systematically tested in the nonviolent resistance literature. In general, ethnicity is mainly explored in relation to violent mobilization and is less understood in the context of nonviolent uprisings. Thus, in this chapter we contribute to the current literature by examining how ethnicity affects nonviolent mobilization.

In order to effectively challenge unyielding and repressive regimes, nonviolent campaign participants need to reach a certain level of agreement, coordination and commitment. Solving complex collective action dilemmas might be easier in ethnically homogeneous states, presuming that common ethnic identity instils a greater sense of common purpose and motivates people to come together to act on behalf of a larger collective (Marwell and Oliver 1984, p.16; Hardin and Higgins 1996; Opp 2009). Coordination and cooperation may be difficult in diverse societies, in particular when ethnic divides prevent people from developing overarching identities and aims that go beyond ethnic boundaries. Recent anti-government uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa illustrate the dilemmas protesters face when seeking to remove oppressive and corrupt regimes in ethnically diverse states. For instance, the decision by the Sunni majority to confront Assad's oppressive regime in 2011 might have been perceived by others as Sunni's attempt to institute their own monopoly on power in Syria (Polk 2013). This perception has negatively

affected the Syrian nonviolent movement and it eventually led to a violent and devastating civil war. The case of Syria indicates that a motivation to address economic and political inequalities can be overshadowed by ethnic divides and diverging interests, lessening the potential for a widespread, nonviolent mobilization.

The scope of the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa was largely unexpected despite the fact that people in these regions have long suffered under autocratic rule. The repressive nature of these autocratic regimes as well as a lack of responsiveness to protesters' demands in the past have negatively affected people's expectations that a change is possible (see for ex. Egypt case study, Bishara 2015). Autocracies, when compared to democracies, are more effective in preventing protests, less likely to accommodate protest demands and more likely to employ repression (Carey 2006). Even though autocracies exert greater control over their population, grievances stemming from unequal distribution of wealth and power and identity-based discrimination act as a motivating factor, and rebellions do emerge despite unfavorable conditions (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015). Nonetheless, economic and political grievances are not always sufficient to evoke large-scale nonviolent resistance. Despite the difficult economic and political conditions across the Middle East and North Africa, protests did not emerge in all the states in the region, and have also greatly differed in the terms of the type, the size, the tactics and the outcomes (White et al. 2015). Given the grievances in non-democracies, ethnic divisions could to some extent explain why we see the onset of nonviolent campaigns in some non-democratic states but not in others. The levels of cooperation and coordination needed for nonviolent campaign initiation may be difficult to achieve in ethnically diverse and divided communities.

Even in anocracies, years of economic inequality and poverty do not often lead to the emergence of large-scale nonviolent anti-regime campaigns (ex Latin American states – see Appendix 6.1). This is puzzling, since anocracies, the types of the regimes that are neither fully democratic nor fully autocratic, could potentially be more susceptible to uprisings due to political and institutional instability as well as a lower likelihood of violent repression in these types of regimes. It is possible that, instead of relying on violent repression, anocracies employ cooptation, offering rents to various societal groups in exchange for their support (Gandhi and Vreeland 2004). Both, autocracies and anocracies employ various strategies to 'conquer and divide' an opposition – all with one aim – to prevent challenges to their power and demobilise masses. Thus, in this paper we focus on examining the effect of ethnic divides in non-democratic regimes.

In the following sections, we highlight the gap in the current literature on ethnicity and nonviolent mobilization and develop a theory on how and under which conditions ethnicity may affect nonviolent struggle.

2.2 Ethnicity, Nonviolence and Potentials for Change

Ethnic demography, a relatively static and stable structural factor, has often been linked to a number of dynamic political outcomes. The Ethnic Diversity Index is used to capture the religious, linguistic and/or racial demographic characteristics of a country (Alesina et al. 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). It measures the probability that two individuals randomly drawn from the overall population belong to different ethnic/religious/racial groups. This index has been actively used to test the causal relationship between ethnicity and civil war as well as economic

performance, democratic consolidation and public goods provision among others (Horowitz 1985; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Alesina et al. 2003; Alesina and LaFerrara 2005; Merkel and Weiffen 2012; Schaeffer, 2013). The current literature offers some insights into social and political conditions under which ethno-nationalist mobilization leads to violent conflict (e.g. the emergence of terrorist or rebel groups). Even though the precise mechanism through which such violence emerges is not well understood (Cederman et al. 2010, p.7), ethnicity is often used to explain onset of violent conflict. This is mainly due to inadequacies in the data and the measures used to capture the most relevant features that connect ethnicity to particular socio-political outcomes.

The studies that take into account the extent to which ethnic demography goes together with political or economic marginalization are better able to capture the depth of the divisions and the conditions under which ethnic cleavages increase the risk of civil wars (Cederman et al. 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug 2013; Gubler and Selway 2012) or negatively effect on economic performance (Posner 2004). It has not been until recently that scholars have begun to examine ethnic group relations beyond ethnographic characteristics. The Ethnic-Power Relations (EPR) dataset (Cederman et al. 2010) is the first project to collect information on ethnic groups' access to political representation, adding an important dimension to the existing demographic measures of ethnicity. The EPR has information at the group level for 758 distinct ethnic groups and their access to state power between 1946-2014 (Cederman et al. 2010, p.14; Vogt et al. 2015). We use the EPR data in this chapter to calculate the measure of ethnic diversity that captures ethnic power relations between relevant groups.

Existing research has primarily focused on exploring the links between ethnic marginalization and the risk of violent challenges against the state, in particular separatist civil wars. In comparison, there has been less effort to understand the effects of ethnicity on the initiation of nonviolent campaigns. Studies have shown that nonviolent campaigns tend to be urban based, non-sectarian, and typically directed against authoritarian governments. Despite the overall non-sectarian character of nonviolent campaigns, we know little about the conditions under which ethnic cleavages constrain actors to mount nonviolent challenges against the government. In cases where ethnic differences are exploited and politicized, the possibility for nonviolent collective action may be low given the negative effect of salient ethnic cleavages. Ethnicity may play more of a role in non-democratic and poor states where the regime either lacks resources to include all groups or where ethnic favouritism is encouraged to ensure the dominance of one's own group regardless of the available resources (Wimmer et al. p. 321). In such societies, loyalty to a particular ethnic identity may become more important than a need to improve social and political conditions for all (Wright 2009 p.865). Potentials for collective action may be low in non-democratic states that promote this type of ethnic politics.

A great deal of politics is nonviolent, which in turn raises questions about how nonviolent alternatives to violent conflict are best conceptualized as contentious activities. Once the need for a change in governance is recognized and expressed, people can either pursue their goals via official channels such as elections if possible or express their claims outside of the government sanctioned protocols. Following Sharp's (1973) efforts to catalogue nonviolent forms of resistance (see e.g. Bond, 1994 and Bond et al. 1997 for extended discussions), it is common to distinguish

between routine politics (i.e., carried out within the conventions of a political system such as forming parties), convention breaking forms of direct action that entail either acts of commission (i.e., doing something that the government tries to prevent people from doing, such as demonstrations) or acts of omission (i.e., refusing to do something that the government orders people to do, such as tax boycotts). In addition, some nonviolent campaigns tend to engage in creating alternative institutions to set a stage for easier transition or to prevent conflict escalation. A good example of this is the work of the Regional Command Councils in Syria, where both civilian and armed groups have worked together to create an alternative local governance by establishing an underground clinic system, an alternate economy, schools, media, and transportation system (Bartkowski and Kahf 2013).

Most analyses of nonviolent direct action had been either case-specific or focused only on a small number of cases (e.g., Schock 2005), but systematic comparative analyses have been greatly advanced by the NAVCO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). This dataset contains information on cross-country, large-scale maximalist campaigns that reflect incompatibilities against the central government or territory, providing a useful comparison to data on civil wars. NAVCO 2.0 dataset, counts 109 nonviolent and 142 violent onsets of major resistance campaigns, during the 1945-2006 period, with nonviolent campaigns becoming more frequent in the recent decades, in particular after the 1980s (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). This excludes nonviolent direct action over policy issues such as the environment or same-sex rights, which may be common, but normally have no corresponding referents in the violent domain, at least not on the large scale. Violent and nonviolent campaign strategies are not necessarily mutually

exclusive, but the campaigns are characterized as either "primarily violent" or "primarily nonviolent" in NAVCO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013).

The current literature also tends to focus on the relative effectiveness of observed nonviolent campaigns (see Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), with much less emphasis on the onset or the sorts of contexts that are more likely to see campaigns break out (with some exceptions, ex. Dahl et al. 2014; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015). Dahl et al. (2014) develop a theory of nonviolent action highlighting the mobilization advantages of nonviolent direct mobilization for large constituencies or political groups, given the lower barriers for nonviolent mobilization in such cases, as the government is less likely to successfully exert control over a large population. In our case, ethnic homogeneity (a lack of ethnic diversity) would indicate that one large, homogenous ethnic group could carry mass mobilization on their own more effectively when compared to numerous ethnic groups. Furthermore, consistent with the idea that resources are important for collective action and the ability to target the government through non-cooperation, Dahl et al. (2014) also find that campaigns are much more likely in countries with an urban population where individuals can be mobilized in the capital, with the highest likelihood of nonviolent campaigns in more urbanized autocracies. It is important to note that the presence of news media and the levels of reporting differ between urban and rural regions, so it is also possible that the nonviolent campaigns are underreported in the rural settings. Urbanization, as an important resource mobilization factor is taken into consideration in the current paper.

Nonviolent campaigns represent a great threat to the survival of autocratic regimes, with nonviolent campaigns being twice as successful in overthrowing a regime in comparison to violent anti-regime campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005). For instance, nonviolent anti-government

campaigns have played a major role in toppling a long-lasting, authoritarian, personalist rule of Suharto (1967-1998) in Indonesia and Marcos (1965-1986) in the Philippines despite violent government repression (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Interestingly, while both campaigns were successful in removing these regimes, opposition in the more ethnically homogenous Philippines seemed to be better organized and more cohesive in comparison to the opposition in the more ethnically diverse Indonesia (Aspinall 2005). It is possible that the Philippine's religious and cultural homogeneity has served as a basis upon which various political parties and organizations were able to come together to oppose Marco's regime in 1983 in a more organized manner. The emergence of a nonviolent campaign in the more ethnically diverse Indonesia in 1997 suggests that despite the high levels of ethnic diversity and autocracy, successful nonviolent mass mobilization is still possible. In the case of Indonesia, a student-led, sustained and increasingly institutionalized nonviolent campaign was able to eventually build a large and diverse network of individuals and organizations, and successfully confront the regime as Indonesia was facing a massive economic crisis in 1997 (Boudreau 2000). It appears that under these conditions, government repression backfired, resulting in protests spreading geographically and across both, wealthy and impoverished groups (Boudreau 2000, p.37). Thus, economic stagnation may in some cases help facilitate nonviolent campaigns in diverse autocracies.

Studies also suggest that nonviolent protests appear to play an important role in bringing about transitions to democratic rule in autocratic states (e.g., Sharp 2003; Teorell 2010). Celestino and Gleditsch (2013) find that the presence of nonviolent campaigns increases the likelihood of transition to democratic regimes, while the regime that falls after a violent campaign is more likely to be replaced by a new

autocratic rule. Ethnicity appears to play a negative role in this transition process. Merkel and Weiffen (2012) demonstrate the adverse effects of ethnicity on democratic transition and consolidation, as countries with the highest ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) scores are more likely to end up in the category of failed democratizes. As the example of Syria suggests, small ethnic groups that feel threatened during the transition process may choose to side with the incumbent government simply out of fear that the new government will continue similar repressive policies and that their minority status may not significantly change once the other, larger ethnic group takes over. Thus, given that opposing regime injustices encompasses a complex set of cooperation and coalition building dynamics, ethnic diversity should be taken into account when studying nonviolent collective action. Ethnic identity plays a significant role in mobilization of people and resources and the following section we explore the conditions under which ethnic identity presents a barrier for collective action in non-democracies.

2.3 Nonviolent Campaigns: Incentives and Barriers in Non-Democracies

Injustices, opportunities and effective mobilization networks are needed for the initiation of both, violent and nonviolent uprisings (Geddes 1999; Goldstone 2009; Nepstad 2011; Butcher and Svensson 2014). Underlying grievances can be similar in both, violent and nonviolent campaigns, however, the factors that facilitate each campaign onset and continuation differ. While the initiation and the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns depends on mass mobilization, loyalty shifts and direct challenges to government legitimacy, in contrast, violent campaigns rely more on

military capacity and skill, territorial control and the direct degradation of government capacity (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015, p.3; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). The level of participation is much higher in nonviolent campaigns, both in terms of the number of active participants and the geographic scope. Given that nonviolent campaigns rely on *people power*, cooperation across various groups is an important prerequisite for a broad-based nonviolent resistance campaign. In contrast, cooperation across various ethnic groups is often not needed for the emergence of violent campaign against a regime. Violent and nonviolent campaigns differ in terms of conditions that facilitate each campaign, the goals and participation levels, and so this paper focuses primarily on the onset of nonviolent campaigns.

The barriers to nonviolent mobilization are numerous; ranging from government repression to a lack of organizational and resource capacity to initiate uprisings. Coordination and cooperation challenges exist in ethnically homogenous as well as ethnically heterogeneous societies. However, these types of issues may become even more difficult to resolve in ethnically heterogeneous states due to lower levels of trust and participation in ethnically diverse societies (Putnam 2007; Alesina and LaFerrara 2000). Opp (2009) suggests that the cost-benefit calculation to join nonviolent campaign is different when one identifies with a group, as loyalty and interest in group goals may provide additional motivation to join mass mobilization (p.226). Thus, individuals may be more likely to embrace collective action in cases where personal and group interests overlap and where ethnic divides are less present.

While an individual affiliation with an ethnic group is often determined by birth, the extent to which individuals identify with a particular group can be influenced by socio-political conditions in a country (Smith et al 2014; Thomas and Louis 2013; McGarty et al. 2014) as well as one's subjective sense of common ancestry and

culture (Benski et al. 2013, p.552). In some societies, ethnicity, race, language or class boundaries may present a barrier for collective action, in others, these boundaries are less important. Ethnic ties and allegiances may be re-negotiated and altered in cases where people are free to join and establish formal and informal socio-political networks that go beyond ethnic boundaries. This is largely possible in democracies where power is shared and people enjoy freedoms of association and assembly. On the contrary, limits to social participation in non-democracies may negatively affect inclusion and integration of diverse populations and deepen ethnic divides. Thus, given that democracies promote greater inclusion and people are able to use official channels to take a political action (Schock, 2003, p.705), the focus of this chapter is on the emergence of nonviolent campaigns in non-democracies.

Syria provides a good example of the potential challenges that nonviolent movements face when engaging in efforts to topple authoritarian governments in ethnically diverse states. Since Hafaz Al-Assad decisively seized power in 1970, political power in Syria has been strictly organized along ethnic lines with the Alawites exercising control over the military, intelligence and security apparatuses, despite the group constituting less than 11% of the total Syrian population (Nepstad 2013; Polk 2013). Although Syria had been relatively politically stable until 2011, nonviolent protests in key cities such as Damascus and Aleppo have initially led to a wider scale, non-sectarian unrests, bringing together participants from different ethnic and religious communities (Bartkowski and Kahf 2013; Sinjab 2011). In turn, massive government repression and the perceived vulnerability of the Syrian government have motivated a number of Syrian Army soldiers to defect and form the so-called Free Syrian Army with an aim to seize the control of the Syrian government by armed means (Bartkowski and Kahf 2013; Berti and Paris 2014). One of the

consequences of this turn was an increase in sectarianism since the Free Syrian Army was perceived to be Sunni dominated (Nepstad 2013). Following this development, the government has used fear to influence the views of minority groups, asserting that their safety will be compromised in case the opposition wins, dividing the protesters along sectarian and ethnic lines (Matthiesen 2013, p.120; Berti and Paris 2014, p.24). As Syrian opposition became fractionalized, violent conflict escalated, eventually leading to the rise of the Islamic State as a key actor. In short, efforts to develop nonviolent campaigns in ethnically diverse, autocratic states may be thwarted by ethnic divides.

Anocracy, another type of non-democratic regime, is primarily studied in relation to civil wars. While some studies find that these types of regimes are more prone to civil wars (see Herge et al. 2001), others suggest the opposite (Vreeland 2008; Cunningham et al. 2017). The literature on nonviolent campaigns rarely distinguishes between the two types of non-democratic regimes, as both, autocracies and anocracies employ strategies that deter protest activities. Recent study by Cunningham et al. (2017) is an exception, showing that anocracies are more likely to experience claim making activities, but not more likely than autocracies to experience the onset of large-scale nonviolent campaigns as coded in the NAVCO 2.0 dataset (1000 or more people engaged in a sustained anti-regime campaign for more than a year), the event type which is the focus of this chapter. Thus, given the findings by Cunningham et al. (2017) which show that non-democracies are more likely to experience nonviolent campaigns when compared to democracies and that anocracies are not more likely than autocracies to experience the onset of large-scale nonviolent campaigns, this chapter examines the effect of non-democratic regimes as a single category.

Engaging in a contentious interaction with a more powerful state apparatus poses a certain level of risk regardless of the type of the regime that's being challenged. Nonetheless, activists are more likely to incur greater costs when opposing non-democratic regimes (Schock 2003). For instance, Egypt's Court decision to sentence 230 activists to life imprisonment for their actions during the 2011 uprising against the former President Hosni Mubarak, illustrates the severity of the risk that protesters can face (BBC 2015). Given the risks and ideological divergences in Egyptian society, how did millions of people come together in 2011 to oppose Egypt's authoritarian government? Did overarching Egyptian identity to some extent facilitate the emergence of nonviolent collective action in the country that has been controlled by the powerful military and autocratic leadership for several decades? Ethnic ties could provide a level of organizational capacity needed for nonviolent mass mobilization. Relying on nonviolent methods to purse maximalist goals such as regime change requires considerable unity in opinions and strategies as well as large numbers of highly motivated participants (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).

Non-democratic regimes often rely on repressive tactics to deter collective action by limiting the opportunities for people to openly meet and evaluate whether others share their grievances and goals, which makes it difficult for potential participants to determine the level of public's dissatisfaction with the regime (McGarty et al. 2014, p.728). Interestingly, some governments are concerned with the public's outpouring of criticism as much as with their support. For instance, Chinese government is imposing severe limits to association by censoring any social media discussions that have a collective action potential regardless if people are expressing complaints or compliments towards the regime (King et al. 2014; Little 2015). The restrictions that autocracies place on participation and organization reduce the flow of information,

preventing individuals from forming a common understanding of grievances and goals. These types of conditions may also limit potentials for developing an over-arching supranational identity, which enables people to identify with others beyond ethnic boundaries. Being able to take into consideration needs and grievances of others and identify with nonviolent campaign goals beyond the bounds of ethnicity can lead to an increase in the numbers of participants as well as the commitment to withstand repressive government actions. Thus, autocratic structures can be viewed in terms of both, grievances and barriers to nonviolent mobilization.

Some studies suggest that highly repressive autocracies may make any type of anti-regime campaign less likely (Hegre et al, 2001). On the contrary, Davenport (2004) argues that even though autocratic regimes exert greater control over their population and limit participation, nonviolent resistance is common in autocracies due to inherent problems in these types of states. Despite the limitations that autocratic regimes impose on political action and organization, nonviolent anti-government campaigns occur more often than in democracies as grievances are plentiful in autocracies. However, given that protests in autocracies tend to occur outside of the institutionalized bounds and involve a substantial amount of risk, many autocracies enjoy long periods of stability, without significant instances of mass mobilization. Nonviolent campaigns that emerge in autocracies must be able to overcome numerous barriers imposed by the restrictive and repressive autocratic regimes. Nonetheless, collective action is still possible and it is to be expected to succeed when people mobilize in large numbers.

The challenge to mobilize a large number of committed individuals is present in comparatively less repressive regimes such as anocracies. Initiating a sustained, organized, mass-scale nonviolent campaign requires a certain level of cooperation

and commitment by a large group of individuals who may struggle to overcome opposing interests and aims. Even though people in anocratic states such as former Yugoslavia have enjoyed certain freedoms of association and participation and were able to develop an overarching Yugoslav identity, ethnic tensions have prevented Yugoslavs from jointly confronting the Communist regime. The protest movements that emerged during the 1970s-1990s period were primarily of separatist and ethnic character. Despite the presence of economic and political grievances, the Yugoslav Communist Party held onto the power for more than four decades. The resistance movements that occasionally emerged, were marred by ethnic divides and grievances (Cox 2004). Both, autocratic and anocratic states are equally able and do exploit ethnic grievances to demobilise masses. Thus, this chapter does not distinguish between the two types of non-democratic regimes. Mass mobilization is a primary component of any nonviolent civil resistance campaign and a certain degree of consensus among participants is vital for the campaign initiation and desired outcome. Participation in nonviolent resistance campaigns tends to be larger in comparison to violent campaigns as people face less barriers in terms of physical strength, commitment, information, and moral dilemmas (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Given the differences in the mobilization paths and the large body of literature on ethnicity and violent conflict, the current paper focuses on examining how and if ethnicity affects people's willingness to join a nonviolent campaign. Thus, instead of focusing on tactical choices and shifts between violent and nonviolent tactics, we test whether and how ethnicity makes nonviolent collective action more difficult.

2.4 Propositions

Nonviolent campaigns have the potential to create major shifts in political life, either by ushering regime change or by reforming a regime through a policy change (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015). A realization that ordinary people can successfully challenge repressive, corrupt, and ineffective governments and that mass mobilization is the primary resource needed to achieve social change, has sparked a discussion about the disciplined nonviolent resistance and ways to initiate cohesive and successful anti-government campaigns (Schock 2005; Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Mass nonviolent campaigns face numerous obstacles in terms of human, financial and informational capabilities, and one thing that seems very important for both, nonviolent campaign initiation and successful political transition, is a strong, broad-based, cohesive civic coalition that uses nonviolent methods to achieve its goals.

Ethnic divisions and tensions have a potential to fracture broad-based civic opposition and could help explain why we see the onset of nonviolent campaigns in some non-democracies and not in others, given the motivation and the availability of the resources. Common ethnic identity instils a sense of common purpose, facilitates articulation of goals and grievances, and positively affects coordination. In other words, common ethnic identity helps shape a "shared reality" upon which people base their actions (Hardin and Higgins, 1996; Thomas and Louis, 2013; see Stern, et al., 2014 for discussion). In order to recognize that injustices require united action, a group of people need to be able to either rely on solidarity on the basis of ethnic ties or the links and interests that go beyond ethnic categories to bring together diverse groups of individuals.

For instance, even though pro-democracy campaigns in Serbia and Syria have faced equally unyielding and repressive state apparatuses, with leaders Slobodan Milošević and Bashar al-Assad firmly entrenched in their positions of power, the primary method of resistance differed. While in the more ethnically homogenous Serbia, pro-democracy movement Otpor (2000) was able to sustain a nonviolent campaign, a nonviolent resistance in more ethnically heterogeneous Syria (2011) was quickly overshadowed by violent uprising and ethnic divisions (Nepstad 2013; Bartkowski and Khaf 2013; Polk 2013). In comparison to Serbia, the opposition in Syria was faced with numerous challenges while seeking to establish cooperation across various ethnic groups. Sectarian cleavages in Syria have made it more difficult to form a unified, nonviolent campaign. Given the divisive effects of ethnicity, we propose to test the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *The onset of nonviolent campaigns is less likely in ethnically diverse states.*

Ethnicity plays an important role in some social contexts, and less so in others. Levels of societal interaction and participation determines to what extent people are able to develop collective identity that transcends ethnic and other societal boundaries. For instance, in democracies, where individuals are able to freely communicate and exchange information, develop and embrace social norms and identities beyond their ethnic categories, ethnicity is likely to have less of a negative effect on collective action (Smith et al. 2014). On the contrary, limits to freedom of expression and association in non-democracies deepen ethnic cleavages as people

become less likely to interact with those outside of their ethnic group, which in turns leads to further mistrust and misunderstandings (McGarty et al., 2014).

In non-democratic states where the provision of public goods and access to state power is organized along ethnic lines, politicized ethnic identities may become a barrier for nonviolent campaign initiation. Status and power influence the types of relations in a society, leading to inclusion, exclusion, monopoly or partnership among others (Cederman et al. 2010). The types of social networks that get to be formed in more exclusionary in comparison to inclusionary societies will affect the types of the campaigns we observe (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Klandermans and Staggenborg 2002). Non-democratic societies are characterized by higher levels of political exclusion, economic inequality as well as higher levels of violent conflict occurrence (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013). In the cases where exclusion happens along ethnic lines, anger and resentment can further divide people and fuel violent clashes (Petersen 2002).

Limits to freedom of expression and association exacerbate ethnic divides in non-democracies. Those living under restrictive and oppressive regimes may not be able to easily determine to what extent their grievances are shared by others, gauge the level of the support for the cause, validate their views because of limited social interaction and a lack of information, know enough about the ethnic others to trust them, or interact and relate to others beyond ethnic boundaries. Under these conditions ethnic differences can be exploited, to prevent cooperation and coordination and diminish the likelihood of nonviolent mass mobilization in ethnically diverse non-democracies.

> **Hypothesis 2:** *The onset of nonviolent campaigns is more likely in ethnically homogenous in comparison to ethnically heterogeneous non-democracies.*

2.5 Data and Model Specifications

We use a logistic regression model to estimate the likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset for all independent states during 1946-2006, with country-year as the unit of analysis. Given that ethnic diversity (ED) scores do not greatly vary within a country across time, the estimates in Table 2.2 present robust standard errors clustered by country. We also take into account temporal dependence and present the results including cubic polynomials of the time since last nonviolent campaign in the Appendix 6.3 (Carter and Signorino 2010). The results do not change in any significant way with the inclusion of time since last event.

2.5.1 The Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable, nonviolent campaign onset, is extracted from NAVCO 2.0 dataset. This dataset considers nonviolent campaigns to be events with a minimum of 1000 participants, with purposive and sustained nonviolent action against a government that lasts for a year or longer (Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013). We code *nonviolent campaign onset* as a binary indicator where one indicates the years in which nonviolent campaign starts, and zero otherwise. According to this dataset, there are in total 109 nonviolent campaign onsets for the period under study. In this paper, we analyse nonviolent campaigns (NVC) that either seek to *remove* or *reform* an existing regime. Given our intrinsic interest in nonviolent campaigns against the central government, we only analyse 87 instances of onset where demands are explicitly related to claims for regime change, significant institutional reform and

policy change. Consequently, we exclude all nonviolent campaign onsets that relate to territorial secession, greater autonomy and anti-occupation from the analyses.[3]

Before estimating the models, all observations that had missing values on any of the models' variables were deleted, and so the number of nonviolent campaign onsets is reduced from 87 to 72 as Figure 2.1 shows. Figure 2.1 also shows that nonviolent campaign activity peaks around the 1980s-1990s period. The analysis only includes data after 1960 since most of the early nonviolent campaigns were calls for independence (ex. Nigerian Independence Movement against British occupation, 1947). Also in some cases population and GDP data were missing for that period (ex. South Africa First Defiance Campaign, 1952). Finally, it is relevant to mention that in our sample there are no country-years where both violent and nonviolent campaigns emerge in the same year.

[3] NAVCO 2.0 identifies a total of 109 nonviolent campaign onsets. Out of those, 87 (79,82%) nonviolent campaign onsets are related to incompatibilities with the central government while only 22 (20.18%) are related to demands for territorial change.

Figure 2.1 Count of nonviolent campaigns (NVC) over years. Events included in the current analysis



2.5.2 Explanatory Variables

Our main independent variables are ethnic diversity and non-democracy. Diversity is mainly observed in terms of fragmented distribution of the population over a set of demographic characteristics such as ethnicity, language or culture (Esteban and Schneider, 2008). The ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) index is usually calculated using a Herfindahl concentration index based on the data collected by Soviet ethnographers in the early 1960s and published in the Atlas Narodov Mira (Taylor and Hudson 1972; Posner 2004). The distribution and power-relations between ethnic groups has changed in the last 50 years with some groups becoming more relevant than others, expanding and shrinking in size, emerging and disappearing over time (Posner 2004). Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the ethnic

diversity (ED) scores are calculated using the EPR 2014 version dataset which provides up to date information on group size and their political status (Vogt et al. 2015).

The ED index is calculated with information from the EPR dataset. The EPR data on ethnic group relations captures the relevance and the salience of ethnic categories. We use information on the political relevance that ethnic groups have in a country to calculate salience of ethnic categories; so that ED variable ranges from zero (ethnicity is not salient) to one (ethnicity highly salient). Similar to the ELF, ED measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals from the overall population belong to different ethnic groups. However, we refer to our measure as ED instead of ELF since ELF reflects demographic distribution of ethnic groups, and ED takes into account salience of ethnic categories.

We use Polity2 scale to distinguish non-democracies from democracies (Marshall, Keith, and Robert 2016). Polity2 is a measure of institutional democracy/autocracy, with score of 10 indicating the most democratic and -10 the most autocratic state. Following the convention in the literature, the Polity2 score is used to create a dummy variable, with non-democracies being all the countries that receive 5 or less on the Polity2 score. In Figure 2.2 we show the distribution of ED for non-democratic and democratic states in our sample. In here we see that non-democracies are prone to be more ethnically diverse than democracies.

In addition to these baseline variables, we also test for an interaction between ethnicity and regime type to test the effects of ethnicity on nonviolent campaign initiation in non-democratic states.

Figure 2.2 Boxplot: Ethnic Diversity and Regime Type



2.5.3 Control Variables

We control for several factors that can affect the likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset. First, we control for the share of *excluded population* variable in a given country given that exclusion may make violent campaigns more likely. This information is drawn from the EPR dataset and it reflects the size of groups that lack representation in the executive or cannot exert any political influence and are actively discriminated against. While groups with no influence and groups that are targeted by the government might have plenty of motivation to revolt against the central authority, they might not necessarily be able to develop links and the organizational capacities needed for mass nonviolent mobilization, so in turn, they might resort to violence. The risk of separatist challenges and civil wars is particularly high when there are large, excluded and territorially concentrated groups in the periphery, with

the risk being substantially higher in ethnocracies where smaller privileged ethnic groups exclude larger majorities (Buhaug et al. 2014; Wimmer et al. 2009).

Second, we control for the economic status of the country using the expanded data on GDP per capita from Gleditsch (2002). The nonviolent mobilization literature has shown that GDP per capita is expected to be positively associated with nonviolent campaign onset. Wealthy autocracies are expected to have an advanced level of an organizational infrastructure that can facilitate nonviolent resistance (Butcher and Svensson 2014). In addition, some studies have found negative effects of ethnic diversity on economic performance, so we expect that negative effects of ethnic diversity on overall economic performance will also have an indirect effect on socioeconomic resources that facilitate collective action (Alesina et al. 2003; Alesina and LaFerrara 2005; Merkel and Weiffen 2012).

Finally, we also control for the size of the urban population in a country (Gleditsch 2002, expanded data). The size of the urban population is often found to have a positive effect on the onset of nonviolent campaigns (Dahl et al., 2014; Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015). Urbanization may also increase ethnic diversity in certain regions which could ameliorate negative effects of ethnic divisions. Both variables, GDP per capita and population are logged due to severe nonlinearity.

Table 2.1 Summary Statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max	Sum
Ethnic Diversity (ED)	6,203	0.38	0.27	0.00	0.89	2339.09
Autocracy	6,203	0.59	0.49	0	1	3681
Nonviolent campaign	6,203	0.01	0.11	0	1	72
Urban population $_{log}$	6,203	8.10	1.70	3.00	13.00	50338.64
GDP $_{per\ capita\ log}$	6,203	7.50	1.40	4.40	12.00	46674.14

2.6 Results

Table 2.2 presents six models that estimate the effects of ethnic diversity (ED), excluded population, regime type urban population size and GDP per capita on the onset of nonviolent campaigns. The models are estimated separately to be able to assess independent effects of each variable on the onset of nonviolent campaigns.

Model 1 shows that, contrary to the expectation, ED does not have a statistically significant effect on the onset of nonviolent campaigns. The results do not provide support for Hypothesis 1. Additionally, the results regarding the ED effects on nonviolent campaign onset do not change with introduction of excluded population variable in Model 2 and urban population and GDP per capita in the Model 3 (the sign of the effect changes, but it's still non-significant). Interestingly, the ED effects changes to positive and significant in Model 5. The effect of non-democracy is positive and consistently significant across Models 4-6.

Model 5 results indicate that the presence of two factors, non-democracy and high levels of *ethnic diversity* (ED), reduces the likelihood of the nonviolent campaign onset. The significant and negative interaction between these two variables at the 5% level provides further the support for Hypothesis 2. The positive coefficient for ED in Model 5 indicates that in some cases ethnicity may facilitate nonviolent resistance, but that its potential is greatly reduced in ethnically diverse non-democratic states. In order to interpret logit model interaction term coefficient and determine the direction of the relationship, we plot marginal effects (conditional coefficients) for this interaction term using *interplot* R package. Figure 2.3 shows that with increasing ED, the magnitude of the coefficient of non-democracy on the NVC onset decreases.

Table 2.2 Onset of Nonviolent Campaigns (NVC) /Country Year

	Dependent variable: NVC onset (0/1)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ethnic Diversity (ED)	0.039	0.233	-0.028		**2.009***	2.077*
	(0.524)	(0.548)	(0.613)		(1.217)	(1.223)
Excluded population		-0.532	-0.318			-0.488
		(0.460)	(0.542)			(0.535)
Non-democracy				1.202***	**2.357*****	2.337***
				(0.385)	(0.615)	(0.608)
Urban population $_{log}$			0.360***	0.388***	0.364***	0.359***
			(0.062)	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.062)
GDP per capita log			-0.172**	0.019	0.065	0.061
			(0.083)	(0.095)	(0.094)	(0.094)
ED * Non-democracy					**-2.922****	**-2.791****
					(1.330)	(1.334)
Constant	-4.459***	-4.439***	-6.176***	-8.747***	-9.653***	-9.543***
	(0.249)	(0.249)	(0.718)	(0.965)	(1.028)	(1.016)
Observations	6,203	6,203	6,203	6,203	6,203	6,203
R^2	0.00001	0.001	0.035	0.057	0.067	0.068
chi^2	0.008 (df = 1)	0.922 (df = 2)	25.938*** (df = 4)	41.992*** (df = 3)	49.556*** (df = 5)	50.235*** (df = 6)
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The marginal effect of non-democracy is positive and significant for the range of ED values under 0.63 and negative and significant above this level of ED, indicating that likelihood of nonviolent campaign onset may be low in ethnically diverse non-democracies, with 95% confidence intervals. The opposite is true for democratic states, where the likelihood of the NVC onset increases with an increase in ED levels. One possible interpretation is that ethnic diversity represents less of a barrier for nonviolent campaign initiation in democratic in comparison to non-democratic states. Other potential explanation is that nonviolent campaigns are more common in

ethnically diverse in comparison to ethnically homogenous democracies. Alesina and LaFerrara (2005) find that ethnic diversity has a negative effect on economic performance, which in turn can affect grievance levels. Thus, it is possible that more ethnically homogenous democracies experience less economic grievances and have a lower likelihood of mass-scale nonviolent campaign emergence.

Figure 2.3 Marginal effect of Non-democracy and Democracy on the onset of nonviolent campaigns (NVC) across Ethnic Diversity (ED) values



The effect of GDP per capita changes from negative and significant in Model 3 to positive and non-significant across Models 4-6. Monetary resources may play more of an important role for the campaign continuation and have a more significant effect in the years following the onset, while all is needed for nonviolent campaign initiation is a mass support and participation from the unarmed and highly motivated population. Another possible explanation for this finding is that wealthy non-democracies are more likely to use the funds to control and suppress nonviolent civil resistance. As expected, the size of the urban population is a positive and

significant predictor of nonviolent campaign onsets, and the result is robust across model specifications.

2.7 Model Validation: Simulated Predicted Probabilities

Simulated predicted probabilities is a good test of model's predictive power as it relies on data estimations from the current model to predict events in the future that have not yet occurred (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015, p.16). Figure 2.4 illustrates that the simulated predicted probability of the nonviolent campaign onset in ethnically homogenous and non-democratic states is over 2% with the probability of nonviolent campaigns onset decreasing to less than 0.7% as ethnic diversity increases. While the trend indicates a lower likelihood of the onset of nonviolent campaigns in ethnically diverse non-democracies, the 95% confidence interval is wide. The issue might be related to modelling uncertainties for rare events (Beck and Zuev 2017). Interestingly, the findings in Figure 2.4 show that the observed trend in democracies is opposite to the trend observed for non-democracies in relation the likelihood of the onset of nonviolent campaigns. Given the small number of cases of ethnically diverse democracies where we observe the onset of the NVC, the results should be interpreted with caution. However, the existence of the opposite trend in relation to the regime type, illustrates that ethnicity is more of a barrier in non-democratic when compared to democratic states when it comes to initiating nonviolent anti-regime campaigns. Another possible explanation for the results in Figure 2.4 is that the aggregate Polity 2 index may not provide the most sensitive measure of regime characteristics in relation to the nonviolent campaigns emergence. States employ various tactics to suppress dissent, ranging from physical repression, cooption, and passage of anti-

protest laws to verbally discrediting protesters' demands. Thus, an aggregate measure of regime type might not capture subtle differences in state's tactical responses to protest events. Our results indicate that the onset of nonviolent campaigns in ethnically diverse non-democracies (ED > 0.63) still occurred in 13% of the country-years as Appendix 6.1 illustrates. In Bolivia for instance, the 1977 nonviolent campaign emerged despite high levels of autocracy (-7 on Polity2 scale) and high levels of salient ethnic diversity (0.67). Bolivia did experience several military coups leading up to the onset of nonviolent campaign in 1977; however, according to Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015), coups as a proxy measure of elite instability is not a good predictor of nonviolent campaign onset. The civil liberties index, as a part of the political opportunity model, appears to be the most powerful predictor of nonviolent campaign onset in their study. Thus, we use civil liberties index as coded in Chenoweth and Ulfelder (2015) as a robustness check for hypotheses. According to the Freedom House aggregate data, the civil liberties score for Bolivia during this period ranged from 3-5 (moderately protect almost all civil liberties or strongly protect some civil liberties while neglecting others).

Figure 2.4 Simulated predicted probabilities (y axis) of the onset of nonviolent campaigns (NVC) in ethnically diverse (x=1) in comparison to ethnically homogenous states (x=0), conditional on regime type, across average values of other variables with 95 % simulated confidence intervals.



2.8 Robustness Checks

Freedom House annual global reports on political rights and civil liberties account for the rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals in independent states across the globe (Freedom House, 2015). The sub-categories for assessing civil liberties include questions regarding the freedom of peaceful assembly and demonstration, the legal frameworks to engage in protest actions, freedom of association and membership in civic organizations, interest groups as well as the existence and the effectiveness of

trade unions and other free professional and private organizations. A civil liberties score is entered as a factor variable with 7 intervals, scores ranging from one (wide range of civil liberties) to seven (few or no civil liberties). Results indicate that civil liberties scores between three and seven have a positive and significant effect on nonviolent campaign onset, with a score of 4 being the most consistent predictor (See Appendix 6.2). The inclusion of civil liberties scores slightly changes the significance and the size of the interaction effect *ED* non-democracy,* however, this should be taken with caution as the missing values on the civil liberty data drops the number of campaign onsets from 72 to 63. Thus, the slightly weaker effect of ethnicity and non-democracy in this model may be due to reduction in data points.

2.9 Discussion

Endogeneity related issues are often discussed in nonviolent resistance literature (Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015). The reverse causality between regime type and nonviolent campaign onset in this chapter is taken into account by including a more sensitive measure of a regime's direct impact on people's willingness and opportunities to engage in protest activities – Freedom House civil liberties index. The results in Appendix 6.2 do not significantly change for any of the estimates with the inclusion of civil liberties score. Endogeneity effects are not existent in relation to the ethnic diversity variable – nonviolent campaigns will not affect levels of ethnic diversity.

The findings in this study indicate that ethnicity is related to other political processes besides violent conflict emergence. For instance, the recent study by Bakaki, Böhmelt, and Bove (2016) confirms the role of shared identity in the

mediation processes – closer cultural ties between a mediator and belligerents make mediation more likely. They conclude that common ties make coordination less costly. I draw similar conclusions in the section below in regards to the coordination and cooperation needed to initiate nonviolent mass campaigns.

2.10 Conclusion

In this paper we show that ethnicity presents a barrier for nonviolent mass mobilization in ethnically diverse non-democracies. The results indicate that solving collective action problems may be easier in ethnically homogenous in comparison to ethnically heterogeneous non-democracies. Non-democratic regimes often exploit and politicise ethnic divides to eliminate the threat that nonviolent campaigns pose for their survival. Politicized ethnic groups are more likely to display high levels of in-group favouritism, intergroup biases and opposing interests, all of which impede nonviolent collective action initiation. We conclude that the existence of sectarian cleavages in ethnically heterogeneous non-democratic states presents a barrier for nonviolent mass mobilization and predisposes societies for the emergence of violent conflict.

Ethnic diversity acts as a barrier for nonviolent collective action only when high levels of ethnic diversity coincide with the presence of non-democratic rule. While this finding to some extent explains why nonviolent campaigns emerge in some non-democratic states and not others, more work needs to be done to understand nonviolent campaign trends. In particular, there seems to be a lack of focus on how states and societies plan to address complex diversity of aims, values and goals once the regime is removed from the power. Bringing together opposition networks to

successfully challenge non-democratic regimes via nonviolent tactics requires a genuine investment in developing democratic relations and civil society structures among opposition groups that can help improve social cohesion among politically and socially divided groups during and after anti-government campaign.

The findings from this paper open the opportunity for further research on nonviolent political contestation. In our future research we will aim to identify ways in which demographically and culturally diverse actors, with potentially diverse sets of interests overcome identity and interest based barriers to engage in nonviolent collective action. In addition, we will also aim to examine uprisings beyond violent-nonviolent dichotomy and focus on varieties of civil resistance strategies that range from sit-ins, blockades, consumer boycotts and others.

Chapter 3

Framing and Undermining Dissent: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract

Activists and governments engage in strategic framing of social unrests and utilize news media to influence public. 'Framing' in this chapter is defined as creating a set of ideas and narratives that help us and others interpret and relate to the events around us. Given that governments have a considerable advantage in spreading information, frames articulated by political leaders could have a greater influence on how people make sense of ambiguous situations such as social unrests. Nonetheless, scholars mainly focus on the frames articulated by protest activists. I utilize automated text analysis, structural topic modelling methods, to investigate the framing of the 2014 spring protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina's (B&H) two semi-autonomous entities (areas); the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H) where protests emerged on a much larger scale in comparison to the Republic of Srpska (RS) entity. The findings indicate that the FB&H political leaders have used both sympathizing and delegitimizing frames, while the RS government mainly framed the protests as a threat to the RS autonomy. The RS government's strategy to bypass grievances and evoke more salient issue such as the RS autonomy may help explain low levels of protest mobilization in the RS.

3.1 Introduction

Provocateurs, hooligans and traitors are just some of the words that authorities often use to describe protest participants. Hence, it was somewhat surprising when Željko Komšić, the Chairperson of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), choose to side with the protesters during the 2014 spring protests in B&H. Similarly, Živko Budimir, the President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FB&H), one of the two semi-autonomous B&H entities (areas)[4] also expressed his support, saying that the unrest was justified since the B&H politicians have long ignored the interests of ordinary people (Oslobodjenje 2014.a). This type of support is puzzling given that governments primarily tend to respond to protests either by ignoring or repressing dissent, and less often conceding to protesters' demands (Bishara 2016; Carey 2006; Franklin 2009).

While several high ranking politicians at the B&H national and FB&H entity level have acknowledged that the protests were inevitable and genuine, the officials from the second B&H entity, the Republic of Srpska (RS), were less supportive, referring to the protests as a Bosniak-Croat and a foreign plot against the RS (Oslobodjenje 2014.b). Since the end of the conflict in 1995, the RS leadership has

[4]The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) established that Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) should be divided into 3 administrative units: 2 entities (FB&H and RS) and 1 Brčko Distict (BD) (Appendix 6.5). The FB&H is mainly inhabited by Bosnian Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats, hence the Federation, while the RS is mainly inhabited by Bosnian Serbs. The FB&H occupies 51% of the BH territory and the RS 49%. Brčko District is territorially "divided" between the FB&H and the RS. Brčko Distict is still a self-governing unit, with both, the laws of the District and the B&H national laws having the precedent. Brčko Distict consists of one city, Brčko, with a mixed ethic makeup. The Presidency of B&H, elected every 4 years, consists of 3 members: a Croat, a Bosniak and a Serb representative. They collectively serve as the Head of the State, with each member rotating every 9 months to serve as the Chairperson of the Presidency. Komšić, a Croat member of the Presidency served as a Chairperson until 10th of March 2014 – the period of most intense protest activity was February 2014. Izetbegović, a Bosniak member, took over the position for the following 9 months (see Bertelsmann Stiftung2014; *The Guardian*, May 2014; Søberg 2008).

Ž pronounced similar to *g* in English word *mirage*, č – *ch* as in *Charlie*, š– *sh*, ć– *tch*.

actively sought to safeguard the independence of the RS institutions guaranteed by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). The RS politicians have also called for the RS self-determination on numerous occasions accusing the FB&H Government of attempts to undermine the interests of the RS citizens and the independence of the RS institution (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2015; Sisic and Sajinovic 2014). The 2011 *Gallup* poll showed that the majority of the Bosnian Serbs think that the RS should be able to secede from the B&H in the future (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014). The diverging interests and agendas of the RS and the FB&H politicians as well as the divisions between the B&H's three major ethnic groups have resulted in a wide range of frames and views regarding the reasons behind 2014 spring protests.

This chapter aims to explore the regime's verbal responses to protest events. Based on the findings, the rhetoric (frames) by the government are categorized into three categories: delegitimizing (ex. calling protesters traitors), demobilizing (sympathetic statements), and alternative views (sidelining/ignoring grievances). This chapter contributes to the current protest literature by providing a potential framework for categorizing government frames – an area of research that has received very little attention in the protest literature.

Using automated text analysis tools and methods such as structural topic modelling this chapter shows that the Government officials from the two B&H entities have framed protests differently; the RS officials primarily discrediting protest participants and their demands and the FB&H officials being both, supportive and dismissive of protests. In this chapter I also discuss how this difference in the framing may help explain low levels of protest mobilization in the RS in comparison to the FB&H. The methods I use are exploratory rather than confirmatory, and so the relationship between government frames and mobilization levels is primarily

presented in descriptive terms. Nonetheless, the methods used in this study still allow for a development of a theoretical framework within which government frames can be defined and examined in the future studies. In summary, the primary goal of this chapter is to provide a categorisation of government frames that could help guide future research in linking government frames and protest mobilisation levels.

The systematic categorisation of large sets of documents such as news reports on protest events has been greatly advanced by the automated text analysis tools. Automated text analysis methods can be used to "*assign documents into predetermined categories, discover new and useful categorization schemes for texts, or in measuring theoretically relevant quantities from large collections of text*" (Grimmer and Stewart 2013, p.270). The theoretical quantities of interest in this study are the discourses and topics of discussion that governments engage in when describing (framing) protest events. This chapter seeks to define and classify governments' verbal responses to protest events and address a lack of systematic effort in the current literature to define government frames. Thus, the methods and analyses in this chapter are designed to uncover the language that government officials use to frame uprisings. Government officials interpret and challenge protesters' claims with an aim to create a set of ideas that resonate more widely with a general public than the ideas put forward by protest activists (Johnston and Noakes 2005; Fumagalli 2007). Even though governments engage in a strategic framing of protest events, the current protest literature mainly focuses on the frames expressed by protest participants. This is surprising given that most governments have a considerable advantage in spreading information, and thus, the frames articulated by political leaders could potentially have a greater effect on how people view ambiguous situations such as social unrests (Johnston and Noakes 2005, p.18). To

my knowledge, this is the first study that categorizes and describes government frames.

The current literature on social movements offers important insights into governments' use of physical force to repress protest events (Gurr 1986; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Carey 2006; Davenport 2007), but it overlooks the effects of governments' rhetoric and the language used to intimidate, discredit and undermine protest movements. This chapter shows how governments use language to construct and advance narratives that fit their own political agendas as well as to minimize challenges to their rule. Better understanding of the ways in which governments frame protest situations will improve our comprehension of protest dynamics in general.

Scholars rely on newspaper reports to identify who, when, how and where protests have emerged. Even though newspaper and social media reports are filled with sentiments, due to methodological and theoretical limitations, protest event analysis is often reduced to the study of protest location, size and actors involved. However, in order to better understand the links between place, time and protest intensity, more insight is needed into the frames and vocabularies behind the mass mobilization (Desrosiers 2012).

Recent advancements in quantitative text analysis provide useful tools that can extend the scope of the social movement research. Automated data processing and analysis techniques provide unlimited possibilities for a systematic evaluation of large volumes of political texts (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). While hand-coding of texts requires from researches to pre-define and identify meaningful categories in selected texts, algorithmic procedures rely on minimum human intervention to detect categories that are representative of the content being examined (Mohr and Bogdanov

2013; Krippendorf 2012). Automated coding of latent variables such as protest frames may be more efficient and reliable given that it's based on a data-driven, strict coding rules that can be applied to a large number of texts (Lowe and Benoit 2013; DiMaggio et al. 2013). This chapter utilizes automated data coding and analysis procedures to systematically evaluate frames that emerged during the 2014 B&H protests.

Protest studies primarily examine grievances, resources, political opportunity structures, and tactical choices that activists employ to resist a regime. Some studies also seek to identify preferences, ideologies and frames that help mobilize and/or demobilize communities (see Johnston and Noakes 2005; Fumagalli 2007; Desrosiers 2012). Those that study framing processes primarily focus on the types of frames proposed by protest activists and largely disregard government frames. This chapter extends the current literature by providing theoretical and empirical support for a framework that also involves government frames. The paragraphs below provide a brief overview of the current literature on framing processes from the social movement perspective.

3.2 Framing Processes: Protest Movement and Government Perspective

Frames can be described as a "*schemata of interpretation*" (Goffman 1974) that simplify our world, guide our actions and help us organize our lives by providing a meaning to events around us (Snow et al. 1986, p.464; Opp 2009, p.235). In short, frames are strategic, simple and meaningful ideas developed and deployed to achieve a specific purpose (Snow and Benford 1988; Benford and Snow 2000, p.624).

Frames are particularly relevant in uncertain and risky situations such as social protests, as they guide our interpretation of events and experiences. Persuasive and resonant frames may be enough to mobilize people even when organisational and resource structures are weak or absent (Walgrave and Manssens 2005, p.114). Thus, frames play an important role in political action, linking people's goals and beliefs into a relatable, consistent and a resonant message that can mobilize masses.

In times of social unrest, people are often caught in a recruitment battle between a government and a protest movement. Social movement frames that encompass strategic framing of injustices and goals are often competing with various demobilizing ideas posed by governments whose aim is to effectively counter protesters' claims. For instance, the current President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, then Prime Minister, had actively engaged in negative and delegitimizing framing of 2013 Gezi Park protests, suggesting that protests were instigated by an international interest rate lobby, the foreign media, and even the airline Lufthansa (Reynolds 2013). This type of response can be viewed as a form of verbal repression as the government is questioning the legitimacy of the movement's claims and undercutting the movement's efforts to address existing grievances in Turkey. The Turkish government engaged in verbal and physical repression, successfully suppressing the movement and combating an increase in negative sentiments towards then Prime Minister Erdoğan. While the Gezi Park movement generated large and wide-spread protests across the country (Reynolds 2013), the movement did not produce a lasting policy change (BBC 2016) or a well-organized campaign capable of confronting increasing authoritarian tendencies of the Turkish Government. This outcome could to some extent be explained by the government's choice to verbally discredit and physically intimidate protest participants. Noakes (2005) points out the

importance of understanding framing processes from both, regimes' and a social movements' perspective, saying that "*understanding of official (state) frames is central to understanding the context in which social movements rise, prosper and decline*" (Noakes 2005, p.101). Thus, examining ways in which governments frame grievances in a public space can yield valuable insights into government responses and mobilization processes.

In the current literature, the regimes' framing of protest events is primarily understood in the terms of the *counter-frames*. A handful of studies that discuss government framing of protest events suggest that these frames are largely a counter-reaction to protesters' frames (Desrosiers 2012; Noakes 2005; Benford and Snow 2000, p.617). This view neglects a possibility that a regime might engage in an active and strategic framing of socio-political conditions in the period before and after protests emerge, and not only as a reaction to protesters frames. In order to develop a framework to study government frames, I rely on the theoretical arguments and insights that the current literature offers in relation to the frames articulated by social movement participants and leaders. The social movement literature categorizes social movement framing processes into three categories: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational/mobilization types of frames (see Opp 2009 for a detailed theoretical discussion). Diagnostic framing identifies the sources and the victims of the injustices, prognostic framing involves planning on what should be done and what are the consequences, and motivational framing provides a rationale on why and who should do what to correct injustices (Snow and Benford 1988; Oliver and Johnston 1999; Opp 2009). Frame alignment, another important concept, represents a step in reaching a level of consensus by linking population's pre-existing views, interests and values with those of the framers (Snow et al. 1986, p.464). Van Stekelenburg and

Klandermans (2013) demonstrate the importance of this concept in their study, showing that linking a message of change to a particular aspect of one's identity increases mobilization and commitment to collective action goals. In addition to frame alignment, frame resonance is also an important factor in protest mobilization, as movements aim to increase the salience and the credibility of the proposed frames (Opp 2009, p.260). All these elements play an important role in protest mobilization – having a consistent, credible and a resound message helps movements mobilize large numbers of people and, in turn, successfully resist a regime.

Authorities often question the credibility of protesters and the validity of their demands, yet a classification and a systematic study of government frames is lacking in the current social movement and state responses literature. In the paragraphs below, I discuss the classification of government frames within the same diagnostic/prognostic/motivating framework. I propose that, both, governments' and protesters' framing processes can be understood within this particular framework proposed by the social movements' literature. The one important distinction between governments and protesters is that the goals of these two actors differ. While, protest activists seek to create highly resonant mobilization frames, governments on the other hand primarily promote frames that disrupt, demobilize and delegitimize protest movements.

In order to effectively respond to a protest, a regime may also need to diagnose a source of grievances, consider various scenarios on what the best choice of action would be and its consequences as well as provide a reasonable motive for people to support their views instead of the views of protest activists. It is plausible that governments and protesters may follow similar steps to assess socio-political conditions in a country, but the goals and the outcomes of these assessments differ.

While some governments may be genuinely interested in understanding a source of grievances to improve conditions in a country, others might only be interested in containing the uprisings and limiting the challenges that protests pose to their rule. For instance, Brazilian Government's rhetoric surrounding the passage of the anti-corruption law in 2013 (Moura 2015) and the announcement of additional anti-corruption measures in March 2015 (Darlington and Ford 2015)[5] is an example of the Government's strategic attempts to align its position with the prevailing anti-corruption sentiments in the country and to gain control over the protest movement. Thus, governments may also seek to align their actions with the needs and views of people that they hope to recruit to support their rule.

The language used by protest activists has also been explored in the social movement literature to a certain extent, while language used by government officials is rarely examined in a systematic way. Benford (1993) groups the vocabularies used by protest activists to promote mobilization into following categories; severity, urgency, efficacy and propriety (p.196). Severity and urgency vocabularies are meant to communicate the gravity of a situation and need for urgent action, while efficacy and propriety related words are usually used to impress upon wider population the imperative of coming together to achieve common goals (Desrosiers 2012, p. 12). This chapter utilizes quantitative text analysis methods such as topic models to efficiently and systematically explore numerous newspaper reports, discover most dominant topics of discussion and vocabularies used by government officials when responding to protest demands (Mohr and Bogdanov 2013; Lowe and Benoit 2013; Blei et al. 2003).

[5]According to Darlington and Ford (2015) and Moura (2015) the announcement of new anti-corruption measures happens in March 2015, two years after the initial protests. Protests emerge again in August 2015, the protesters call for the President Rousseff's resignation in August 2015 and the President responds by defending the Brazilians' right to protest.

Topic models offer possibilities to test framing theories and concepts proposed by Benford (1993). Understanding the protest related discourses requires a more detailed study of words that are used to construct particular frames (topics). Topic models offer possibilities to investigate the use of words in both, governments' and protest activists' frames, as the model output provides information on the probability of each word associated with each topic (frame). Quantitative analysis of texts enables systematic exploration of the estimated topics and relational meanings in ways that is not possible with hand-coding of the data (DiMaggio et al. 2013).

The rhetoric that surrounds protests is a part of strategic decision-making processes that involve calculated assessment of the situation by both, governments and dissidents. Entman (2003) claims that "*if the news creates impressions that the idea is held widely and intensely by large swaths of the public, it can affect leaders' strategic calculations and activities"* (p.420). While the rhetoric surrounding protest events can have a significant impact on protest emergence and outcome, the current literature primarily focuses on the use of physical repression such as imprisonments, beatings and other forms of state-sponsored violence. Often, violent rhetoric precedes use of physical violence. The delegitimizing statements by government officials, calling protesters traitors and hooligans, can incite regimes' security forces and their supporters to use physical violence against dissidents. Thus, delegitimizing frames can be considered as a rhetorical version of repression. Governments may rely on these types of frames when they are able to claim the existence of a legitimate enemy of the state, equate protesters' aims with those of an enemy and convince the majority of their population that supporting the protests is a threat to national security and survival. In these situations, a government's use of verbal repression might be a less risky and easily justifiable choice as protesters would be characterised as greater

threat to national interests and peace than a government. This type of frame could be potentially linked to a reduction in number and size of protests, but it could also backfire depending on the levels of anger that these kinds of statements might evoke. Given the scope and the aim of this chapter, it is not possible to systematically investigate regimes' strategic use of various types of rhetoric and mobilisation levels. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that language can possibly serve as an alternative or a precursor for governments' use of physical repression. Similarly, the rhetorical statements of support or dismissal also have corresponding examples in physical actions such as a government's choice to accommodate or ignore protest demands.

In addition to repression, governments can also choose to ignore (Bishara 2016) protests. Ignore category is rarely studied in the government responses literature and the definitions of this category vary. Bishara (2015) defines the ignore response as any government action that appears dismissive of protest participants either through inaction or contempt. Other researchers refer to a government's choice to ignore protests as a strategic tolerance – a regime allows protest activities only to be able to identify who are the dissidents that they can payoff (Cai 2010; Yien and Cheng 2017). Either way, by ignoring or temporarily tolerating protest activities, a government's primary goal is to undermine protest movement. The Turkish Government's choice to evoke nationalist sentiments to justify rebuilding of historical structures in Gezi Park (BBC 2016) is an example of the government's choice to verbally ignore actual protest demands by sidelining the existing grievances. The choice to ignore and/or sideline grievances is a likely option when governments can exploit nationalist or ethnic issues that trump other types of grievances. These types

of government frames have a potential to reduce mobilisation levels and garner more support for the government by taking attention away from the actual grievances.

Another possible response is accommodation, a regime's choice to accede to protest demands (Franklin 2009; Ryckman 2016). Sympathizing with protesters' demands can be considered a version of rhetorical accommodation. The Brazilian President's choice to respond to protesters' demands by defending their right to protest despite the calls for the President's resignation is an example of verbal accommodation (Darlington and Ford 2015). It is possible that numerous and repeated protests over economic issues and corruption in Brazil have led the government to concede to protesters demands by passing new anti-corruption laws as well as limiting the regime's verbal responses to sympathising rather than dismissive or discrediting statements. Economic grievances have a potential to mobilize large groups of people which could be more difficult to control and more risky to repress, and so sympathising statements might be a better option. Thus, it is possible that governments that face these kinds of threats are more likely to express sympathy towards protesters and accommodate their demands. Other types of the claims such as calls for regime change might receive less sympathy from a government as these represent a direct challenge to their rule.

While the question of the relationship between the regimes' rhetoric and the actual physical actions is worth exploring, that is beyond the aim of this chapter. The point of the comparison and the discussion in the paragraphs above is to build upon the existing literature on government responses and propose a categorisation of verbal responses. The use of language can signify certain intentions of a regime, and thus a government framing processes deserve a detailed and systematic investigation.

Government narratives serve to demobilize masses and suppress protest challenges. In some cases, regimes choose to address and accommodate grievances, while in others, strategic framing is used to either delegitimize protests or offer alternative views that trump grievances. The case of B&H provides a good example to study variability in government responses as the country is territorially, ideologically and politically divided along ethnic lines. Ethnic differences and past experiences are often exploited by politicians to further divide people and undermine a collective anti-regime campaign. For instance, the RS President Milorad Dodik's reaction to the 2014 protests in B&H, who repeatedly called for "an independent RS," is an example of the Government leader promoting and maintaining an alternative view that sidelined economic grievances that are equally affecting all ethnic groups in the country. The RS government's strategy to bypass grievances by evoking a more salient issue such as the RS independence from B&H, may help explain low levels of protest mobilization in the RS. In addition to using negative and dismissive language to discourage the population in the RS to join the nation-wide protest efforts, President Dodik had also used conflicting types of statements to address people in the RS by saying

> "*I am grateful to the citizens of the RS who did not fall for the provocations coming from the Federation (FB&H) or their satellites here in the RS (*he refers here to the potential FB&H sympathizers within the RS*), who wanted to raise up here in the RS under the facade of solidarity*" (Vukic, *Nezavisne Novine*, 10th of Feb, 2014).

The B&H's socio-political and territorial divisions (Appendix 6.5) and the government structures (2 different entity governments, 1 state) provide a model case to study protest discourses and effects of government narratives on protest mobilization. Given that the economic and social conditions are equally

unsatisfactory in both B&H entities, the emergence of protests in the Bosniak-Croat dominated FB&H entity and a lack of significant mobilization in the Serb dominated, RS entity is puzzling (see Table 3.2). The paragraphs below provide a detailed overview of the B&H country characteristics – political, social, and economic conditions that preceded 2014 spring protests.

3.3 Background: What were B&H 2014 protests about?

> "*We need to get back to what is the real cause of the protests. We should not forget what led to them: poverty, unemployment, corruption and injustice. These are protests against injustice and corruption, and they should never be viewed as a conflict along ethnic lines."* Željko Komšić, Oslobodjenje, 11 February, 2014
>
> "*Domestic traitors and foreign mercenaries instructed by the FB&H political circles, the international community and anti-Serb non-governmental sector*" Milorad Dodik on who initiated the protests, an interview with Radio and Television of Republic of Srpska, as reported in Oslobodjenje (b.), 15th of February, 2014

Twenty years after the end of the 1990s ethnic conflict in B&H, demobilized soldiers, unemployed and outraged people from all walks of life, have come out to voice their despair over years of corruption and exploitation by domestic and international elites (Mujanovic and McRobie 2014; Pugh 2005). While in the eyes of aggrieved B&H citizens, the 2014 spring protests were an opportunity to force the corrupt and inadequate ruling elites to take the responsibility for their actions, in the eyes of the international community, primarily the High Representative for B&H, Valentin Inzko, and some Government officials, the protests were seen as a crisis that need to be contained (Arsenijevic 2014). The fears of possible ethnic clashes were not

entirely farfetched as people in B&H are still struggling to overcome the consequences of the 1990s ethnic war.

Protest gatherings provide a space for people to come together to vocalize and learn about individual and collective injustices (McGarty et al., 2013). Protests can be a unifying force in a society that seeks to collectively confront government injustices, however, protests can also deepen societal divides as various individuals and groups express their goals and views. This chapter illustrates the complexities that arise with initiating nonviolent resistance in ethnically diverse states. Salient ethnic identities can prevent people from engaging in a collective, peaceful action against a state or even worse, result in violent conflicts such as the case of Syria illustrates.

The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) has ended the conflict in the B&H, but it did not end ethnic grievances and injustices. With the Bosniak-Croat coalition forces on one side and the Serb forces on the other, the ethnic war has claimed many lives on all sides and displaced numerous people from their homes (Stefanovic and Loizides 2011). The International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia proceedings have not led to an improvement in ethnic relations (Dojčinović 2012). The country is still territorially divided with the Bosniak and Croat population primarily living in the FB&H entity and the Serb population residing in the RS. Nonetheless, it is still possible that familial and friendship ties that existed in B&H prior to the 1990s conflict and the limited networks of cooperation that were build in the post-conflict period could help improve the ethnic group relations in the future. According to Skoko (2010) survey results, ethnic groups in B&H have both, negative and positive views of each other, with Bosniaks perceiving Serbs as cruel and nationalistic, but also admiring them for their unity and diligence; Croats admiring

Bosniaks for their hospitality and loyalty to their faith, but also think of them as hypocritical; and both Bosniaks and Serbs admiring Croats for their commitment to preserving their culture. Past experiences and existing stereotypes can present a barrier for collective action as governments may choose to exploit these to disrupt protest mobilization.

In addition to the presence of ethnic divides, the B&H suffers from high levels of unemployment. Table 3.1 summarizes the levels of unemployment on the national and entity levels for the 2012-2014 period (Labour Force Survey 2014, p, 31-32). The unemployment estimates are even higher in some other reports, ranging from 44%-60%, with estimates that every 6th citizen in B&H is living below the poverty line (Dedic 2013; p.2; Ceriani and Ruggeri 2015). Patronage networks, institutional inefficiencies and culture of impunity are widespread, and as a result, the violations of worker's and human rights are numerous and rarely persecuted (Dedic 2013). Cronyism and nepotism permeate every level of B&H society and people are often forced to resort to bribery to secure services and jobs in health, safety, administrative and other areas (UNODC Report 2011). Overall, the total level of social exclusion as measured by three indicators (risk of poverty, financial depravation and labour intensity) is slightly higher in the RS (52.6%) than the FB&H (45.6%), however, with both scores close to half of the population feeling marginalized (Ceriani and Ruggeri 2015 p.16).

Table 3.1 Total unemployment rates in FB&H, RS and B&H, 2012-2014, by gender.

%	Male	Female	**Total 2012**	Male	Female	**Total 2013**	Male	Female	**Total 2014**
FB&H	27.7	32.2	**29.4**	27.1	28.4	**27.6**	25.7	32.7	**28.4**
RS	23.8	28.2	**25.6**	25.3	29.5	**27.0**	23.8	28.4	**25.7**
B&H	26.4	30.7	**28.0**	26.5	29.0	**27.5**	25.2	31.2	**27.5**

Despite the high levels of economic and social grievances, mass scale protests are rare, with the exception of protests in 2014. One possible reason for low numbers of protests is a lack of common vision in the country. International Crisis Group report (ICG 2014) describes this lack of unity in the country in their report – "*loved by some of her citizens, barely tolerated by others, Bosnia lacks a common narrative*" (p.17). A lack of common ties, existence of ethnic divides and a governments' framing of protest events could help explain the differences in the observed mobilization trends in the two B&H entities as presented in Table 3.2 (Belgioioso, Gleditsch and Vidović 2017).

Table 3.2 Number of protest events and participants (see Belgioioso, Gleditsch and Vidović 2017 for detailed information)

	Daily Event Count_ Nonviolent Protests	Daily Event Count_ Violent Protests	N of protest participants in a single day
FB&H	77	12	13 000
RS	6* (2 pro-government)	0	300

In addition to the high unemployment rate, the B&H bureaucracy is one of the most complex and most costly in the region, with the allocations for civil servant

wages being the highest in Europe (ICG 2014, p.25; Dedic 2013, p.4). The country quite literally cannot afford its system of governance, which was always designed as a temporary structure as a part of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). The power-sharing arrangement between the three major ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) and the size of the bureaucracy has contributed to ineffectiveness and corruption across all levels of governance (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014). The mutual trust between the different political institutions is low and the disagreements over the implementation of the DPA are frequent (ICG 2014; Søberg 2008). The RS institutions have a simpler structure, with a strong executive control by a directly-elected President and the Prime Minister, which has resulted in a slightly more effective legislature in the RS (ICG 2014, p.18, 22). The FB&H President is appointed by the FB&H Parliament, the government is less centralized as it consists of 10 cantons (administrative units), each with its own administrative government and ministers (ICG 2014; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014). Doing business in either entity is quite difficult and the government officials hold share in all the major private and public companies (ICG 2014, p.13). Thus, the only observable difference between the two entities is a certain degree of simplicity and efficiency of the RS government, however, the economic conditions in the RS entity are not more favourable in comparison to the FB&H.

The FB&H and the RS are similar in another aspect; there is a distinct pro-government/pro-ethnic bias in the majority of the media outlets in both entities. According to the World Press Trends (2009) report, there are around 180 broadcasters in the B&H (145 radio stations and 43 television stations), but, despite the plurality of the sources, people in both entities are mainly exposed to polarized and biased messages that offer favourable views of their ethnic group over the others (p.257).

Regardless of the bias in the news reporting, the plurality and the availability of information in the B&H suggest that the differences in the protest mobilization levels between the FB&H and the RS cannot be attributed a lack of the freedom of press and the access to information. The three national public broadcasters, state-wide B&HRT, entity-wide RTVFB&H and RTRS, seem to be the most available, popular and trustworthy news sources (Open Society 2012, p.19, p.23). Based on the surveys reported in the Open Society (2012) report, the number of internet users in 2011 has reached 55%, more than ¾ of the B&H internet users, aged 10-75 use internet every day, several times a day, with 15-24 year olds being 93% of the users (p.19, 22). With the 11 daily newspapers, 103 magazines, 8 religious journals, and 75 other publications, B&H print media is the next most common source of news (Open Society 2012, p.25). However, the circulation of any major daily news source does not go above 20 000 per year (World Press Trends (2009 p.259) and even less in recent years (INFOBIRO). The TV transcripts are not readily available; so the next best sources of information on protests were daily news sources (see Data and Method section). The daily news journals often cover the TV reports, in particular interviews given by the political leaders and protest activists. The daily news sources used in this study are also increasing their online presence, with *Nezavisne Novine*, the RS based newspaper, ranking number 24 out of 100 most visited online news portals in the B&H (Alexa Web Analytics 2015). The news sources selected in this study offer daily accounts of protest actions and discourses in the B&H during the 2014 spring protests.

Presence of economic grievance and communication technologies that facilitate coordination and communication seem not to be sufficient to explain the divergences in mobilization trends during the 2014 B&H protests. However, ethnic

favouritism, bias and the resort to one's pro-ethnic news sources to stay informed have facilitated isolation and mistrust among members of various ethnic groups. It is likely that under these conditions the B&H Government officials have strategically choose to exploit the existence of ethnic cleavages and a lack of common vision among the B&H citizens to undermine protest mobilization. The following paragraphs present evidence for the types of frames used by the B&H Government to respond to 2014 protest events.

3.4 Data and Method

Two major daily B&H newspaper sources, *Oslobodjenje* and *Nezavisne Novine*, were used to explore the framing of the protest events. *Oslobodjenje* is based in the capital Sarajevo, located in the FB&H entity, and is one of the oldest and most read newspapers in B&H, with mostly Bosniak audience (Open Society 2012). *Nezavisne Novine* is based in Banjaluka, the RS capital. It is a highly circulated news source and primarily read by the Serb population (European Journalism Centre 2007). The news articles were extracted from INFOBIRO, the first and the only digital database of all B&H news reports over the last 50 years, with *Oslobodjenje* averaging 26 articles daily and *Nezavisne Novine* around 17 (INFOBIRO 2015).[6] The articles used in the analysis were restricted to the month of February given that the majority of the protest activities have emerged during this month (Belgioioso, Gleditsch and Vidović 2017). The total number of news articles from both sources for February 2014 was 863.

[6] The author would like to extend special thanks to Dragan Golubović, INFOBIRO Digital Archive, for his excellent and timely communication with the access to the database and article download issues.

I have used regular expressions to identify protest related articles, resulting in 285 articles out of total 863 (*protest mutiny rebellion strike spring riot protesters demonstrators plenum assemblies*). Figure 3.1 illustrates the distribution of protest related articles during the month of February, with an increase in protest activity between 8-15th of February, the height of protest activities (see Belgioioso, Gleditsch and Vidović 2017 for protest event analyses). Figure 3.1 also shows that *Nezavisne Novine* do not publish on Sundays. After a detailed review of the articles that emerge after 24th of February, I have found that these articles are primarily opinion pieces and less likely to include any direct statements by government officials, which provides additional support for my choice to only focus on the month of February.

One of the potential weaknesses of the data and the analyses here is that I assume that the media reports reflect the Government's rhetoric and framing of protest responses. A news report is a hybrid of information, ranging from the direct quotes and statements made by the Government leaders to sentences describing the context in which protests emerged, to reactions by the world leaders and political pundits. While it can be argued that the government framing cannot be directly inferred through news reports, after the manual review of the news articles I have found that the majority of the articles included in this analysis contain the statements made by one or more government officials. Newspaper reports are a common source of information used in other protest studies and data collection efforts such as the NAVCO 2.0 dataset (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) which is used to conduct analyses in the Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

Figure 3.1 *Nezavisne Novine* (NN) and *Oslobodjenje* (OS) count of protest related daily articles for February 2014. The x-axis shows the dates, y-count of the protest related articles, the orange bars are NN and blue are OS news articles.



3.4.1 Topic Modelling

The basic idea behind generative topic models, such as *latent Dirichlet allocation* (LDA), is that there is a generative process that "produced" the collection of documents (ex. protest events-more protest related news articles), and that while the documents/words are observed, the topics are unobserved, latent, *hidden structures* that have likely generated the observed collection of documents (Blei, 2012 p.78). Topics are comprised of a set of words that frequently co-occur together. Each word can be found in multiple topics, with different probability, and so each topic has its own distribution over words. Similarly, each document can contain multiple topics and each document has its own distribution over topics (Blei 2012). The LDA is a clustering algorithm that can be used to discover which topics are represented in a collection of texts (corpus) based on the words that are used and ways in which words

are used. Each observation can have more than 1 cluster as the same word can belong to different topics. In this chapter, *frame* and *topic* concepts are used interchangeably.

Topic models such as LDA are used to estimate topics from a collection of documents as well as to obtain per-document topic distribution and per-word topic assignment, seeking to find the *hidden* structures by reversing the generative process (Blei 2012 p.79). In addition to the measurement of latent variables, researchers are also eager to explore ways in which document-level information such as author, date or location of published article influence the content of the text (Roberts et al 2016, p.1). The newly developed, Structural Topic Model (STM) approach, a variant of the LDA (Blei et al 2003) algorithm, offers possibilities for a more detailed exploration of how information such as the name of the publication and the publishing date may influence the content of the text (Mishler et al. 2015, p.640; Roberts et al. 2015). This type of additional information is referred to as *metadata*.

The current study utilizes the STM model to examine variations in topic prevalence during the 2014 spring protests (see Roberts et al. 2015 for a detailed discussion of model specifications). A set of newspaper reports represents a corpus from which certain characteristics of a source and a message can be inferred (Roberts 2000). The STM outcome consists of a set of latent, unobservable topics and their associated words (Roberts et al. 2015). The STM output, topic, is interpreted in relation to the words that co-occur together and capture a theme, a topic of discussion for a particular time period. The output also provides a possibility of capturing the prevalence with which each topic occurs in a set of documents for a period of interest. Thus, topic models help us with studying forms that state discourses take during protest events Mohr and Bogdanov (2013).

The current model incorporates covariates such as the newspaper source as well as the publication date. In the case of B&H, ethnic location where the newspaper is published could have an effect on how much each topic is discussed and promoted given that the readership and the ownership of the print media in B&H is strongly divided along ethnic, entity and political party lines (Open Society 2012p.26). This covariate is used to assess topical prevalence, the frequency with which topic is covered in the RS in comparison to the FB&H daily news media, and it is included as a binary variable (Roberts et al. 2015, p.4).

The extent to which the outcome of the STM is interpretable greatly depends on "*the statistical structure of observed language and how it interacts with the specific probabilistic assumptions of STM*" (Blei 2012). Mishler et al. (2015) have applied the STM to study differences in topic prevalence regarding the *MH 17 plane crash* in Ukraine using Russian language tweets and the model seem to have performed well in regards to the language structure and the content being examined. Bosniak/Croatian/Serbian languages belong to a category of Slavic languages and it is expected that the model will perform similarly well. The data is structured so that each row represents a separate observation, starting with a column of text (the content of a newspaper article per day), followed by a date, a newspaper indicator (*Nezavisne Novine*-NN, *Oslobodjenje*-OS) and the unique newspaper article ID. The final corpus contains 285 documents, 12143 unique terms and 79654 tokens.

The data was pre-processed using the natural language tools developed by a team at the University of Zagreb (Ljubešić et al. 2007; FFZG 2016) as well as the tools available through the *tm* R package (Rinker, 2013; Feinerer and Hornik, 2015). Even though B&H has three official languages, Bosniak, Croatian and Serbian, all three languages are very similar and intelligible across the entities (Askew 2012).

The language differences are minimal and thus do not play a significant role in the terms of grammar structure and the types of the words used in journalistic writing. In addition, both newspaper sources use the same Latin alphabet (Serbian language also uses a Cyrillic alphabet). The current project uses domestic news reports, and so the processing of the text had to be modified to include tools from both, the University of Zagreb team as well as the *tm* R package.

3.5 Results

The *stm* searchK function was used to determine the optimal number of topics using held-out likelihood that estimates the probability of words appearing within a document when those words have been removed (Roberts et al. 2014, p.41). Based on the Figure 3.2 below, it seems that 10 is the most appropriate number of topics for this corpus, and that any number after 15 would produce topics that would pick up too much noise from the data.

The validation of unsupervised models of text is an important part of the discussion when reporting the results. A standard way to perform as a first step in validating the topic models such as STM is to be able to assign appropriate labels to the topics in the model output (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Out of the 10 estimated topics, topic 1 seems particularly interesting in the terms of prevalence in the corpus as well as the associated words as Figure 3.3 illustrates. I have sampled 20 documents associated with the topic 1, manually reviewed those and determined that topic 1 for example is a common topic across the selected documents. The next step was to assign labels for each topic in the output (10 topics) that reflect the common theme based on the words that co-occur together in this particular topic. Following the practice of others in the field (Roberts et al. 2014), the topics are hand-labelled

based on the associated words. The Figure 3.3 shows the types of the labels that I have assigned to the topics: alternative, delegitimizing and sympathizing frames. The Figure 3.3 only displays 6 topics as these seem to be the most relevant in terms of the government frames. The output with 10 topics in the Appendix 6.4.

Figure 3.2. Estimated optimal number of topics based on held-out log likelihood



Figure 3.3, Topic Proportion column, shows that the most prevalent topic is Topic 5 with 0.18 topic proportion prevalence in the corpus. The Topic 5 has the largest proportion of the corpora, consisting of words that are more associated with protesters' actions (*government, presidency, building, protesters, canton, fire, demonstrators, attack, citizens*) and less with grievances and goals. Words associated with Topic 5 such as *fire, building* and *attack* indicate that the protesters may have potentially engaged in violence. The words in Topic 10 (RS protesters actions), slightly less dominant topic (.09 topic proportion) also seem to be mainly related to protesters actions. The topics related to the protesters' actions do not seem to contain almost any words that may point to protesters' demands, goals or any mobilization related vocabularies. It appears that the protesters' violent actions have received more news coverage than their demands. Topic 10 only slightly indicates that the RS

war veterans have expressed some anger (*gnjev*) and views regarding a lack of fair treatment given their great sacrifices during the 1990s conflict. Thus, Topics 5 and 10 are not labelled with any protest activists types of frames since these appear to be more a description of protest actions.

Figure 3.3 The dominant topics in the corpus: associated words and their proportions

Associated Words	Topics: Number and Label	Frame Type	Topic Proportion
Dodik, president, peoples, emphasized, pointed out, FBH, Milorad confidence, independence, international, Banjaluka, referendum, analysis, autonomy, Drina, energetic, euro, fund, church	T1—RS independence	Alternative View	**.17**
republic, srpska, government, Dodik, citizens, enemies, numerous, conspiracy, story, republic, nongovernmental, theory, argument, traitors	T7—RS Officials discredit protests	Delegitimizing	.03
government, cantons, citizens, police, demonstrators, Nefic, Lipovaca, Konjuh, last night, street, workers, drugs, hungry, spokesperson, rowdy, Konjuh, traffic, found, last night	T3—FB&H Officials discredit protests	Delegitimizing	.14
FBH, protests, Izetbegovic, president, Komsic, presidency,program, Vucic, Komsic, needed, meeting, injustice, Milanovic,line, conflict, corruption, inter-ethnic, inter-religious, peaceful, national	T2—B&H national and FB&H Officials supports protests	Sympathizing	.11
government, citizens, FBH, presidency, building, demonstrator, cantons, municipality, fire, attack, outside, cantonal, give, main, citizen, come out, Kalesiji, Marsala	T5—FBH protesters actions		**.18**
citizens, RSa, protest, government, fighters, power, elements, communities, return, soldiers, veterans, labour, came, former, work, anger, especially, huge , sort	T10—RS protesters actions		.09

The frames promoted by the political leaders seem to trump those proposed by the protest activists in the terms of the proportion of the government frames (topic proportions) in the corpus and in the terms of salient use of language. While activists mobilization frames are less prominent (topics 5 and 10), the use of the delegitimizing and disruptive frames by the government is dominating the context of the 2014 B&H protests (topics, 1, 7, 3, 2), as can be seen in Figure 3.3.

Based on the words associated with Topic 1 (RS independence), this topic can be described as being related to the RS government's attempts to promote an alternative view of the socio-political conditions. Topic 1 includes the terms related to *the autonomy and the independence of the RS, referendum, international community, FB&H and confidence*. The RS President, Milorad Dodik, has claimed that the protests are strategic attempts by the FB&H government and international community aimed at jeopardizing the RS sovereignty and security (Sisic and Sajinovic 2014; Vukic 2014). President Dodik has often expressed a lack of confidence in the FB&H leadership in the past (Vukic 2014), and even more so during the spring 2014 protests.

According to the Figure 3.4 both, the RS and the FB&H newspapers, have reported on the President Dodik's calls for the RS independence, with the content of the several newspaper articles primarily dedicated to the RS independence discussion, particularly during the peak of the protest activity (mid February, with over 0.80 of the documents/newspaper articles related to this topic). Based on the overall topic proportion value in the corpus (0.17) and the words associated with it, it seems that the most dominant government protest frame in the RS was the issue of independence. Raising the issue of the RS independence during the protests might have been a strategic move by the RS government to distract people from the more

important issues of unemployment, poverty and government inefficiency. This frame sideline protest demands and grievances, offering an alternative, competing and highly salient view of socio-political conditions, a view that potentially trumps existing grievances. This type of the frame can be classified as the government attempt to ignore pressing economic grievances by evoking ethnically salient issue such as the RS autonomy.

Figure 3.4 The number of the documents (circle radius) and the proportion of the document content that relates to the Topic 1, RS independence, (x axis) over the month of February (y axis). *Nezavisne Novine*-NN, *Oslobodjenje*-OS.



Topic 2 (B&H/FB&H Officials support protests) includes the words of support such as *injustices, corruption, inter-ethnic, inter-religious, peaceful, and national* with the names of Komšić, the Chairperson of the Presidency of B&H at that time, and Izetbegović, the member of the Presidency of B&H, being the words with

highest probability in this topic as Figure 3.3 shows. Topic 2 can be interpreted as a supportive type of the frame, used mainly by the high ranking B&H politicians on the national level who primarily represent the interests of the FB&H ethnic groups, in this case: Bosnian Bosniaks (Izetbegović) and Bosnian Croats (Komšić). This frame could be classified as accommodation by the political leaders, but can also be a disruptive type of action, where by sympathizing with the protesters, the government is seeking to bring people to their side and effectively reduce potential for mass mobilization.

Figure 3.5, Topic 2, indicates that the support for the protesters have been expressed in numerous documents/newspaper articles, however, only with a brief mention in comparison to the overall document content. The values on the x axis indicate that for the majority of the newspaper reports, proportion of the newspaper article that relates to the support for the protesters is below 0.20. The articles that were published on 12/13th, 17/18th and 24th appear to contain the most discussion regarding the support for the protesters.

Figure 3.5 The number of the documents (circle radius) and the proportion of the document content that relates to the Topic 2, B&H/FB&H Officials support protests, (x axis) over the month of February (y axis).*Nezavisne Novine*-NN, *Oslobodjenje*-OS.



Topic 3 as shown in the Figure 3.3 (FB&H officials discredit protests) includes some of the words seen in previous topics such as *the government, citizens, protesters*, and other words specific only to this topic such as *Nefic*, *police*, *drugs, discovered, and hungry*. The spokesperson for the Sarajevo Canton Ministry of Internal Affairs, Irfan Nefić, has allegedly said that the drugs and some weapons have been found among the protesters (Malisević 2014). The following day, the statement has been retracted by the spokesman himself, according to *The Istinomjer*, an online platform for monitoring the truthfulness of the statements and events in B&H, however, the report that the drugs have been found were then repeated by other political leaders on the TV stations (Istinomjer 2014). These and similar attempts by some of the leaders in the FB&H government can be interpreted as an intentional

framing of protesters as hooligans in order to discredit their grievances and claims. Topic 3 related articles seem to appear rarely in both NN and OS - except for couple of instances on 11th, 14th and 18th of February as Figure 3.6 shows.

Figure 3.6 The number of the documents (circle radius) and the proportion of the document content that relates to the Topic 3, FB&H officials discredit protests (x axis) over the month of February (y axis). *Nezavisne Novine*-NN, *Oslobodjenje*-OS.



The Topic 7 (RS Officials discredit protests) includes numerous words that were used to discredit and discourage people in the RS entity to join the protests. This particular frame contains the following words: *republic, Srpska, government, Dodik, citizens, enemies, conspiracy, plot, traitors*, clearly capturing Dodik's numerous statements that the protests are a plot against the RS, referring to those who

join protests as traitors and enemies. The topic accounts for a small portion of the corpus (.03) in comparison to the other topics, nonetheless, it contains a great number of salient words that might have a negative effect on protest mobilization. The use of salient words such as *traitors* and *conspiracy* may have helped the RS leadership to create highly resonant frames that could have a demobilizing effect. The frames employed by the RS government are to a great extent similar to the frames used by the Turkish government in 2013 during the Gezi Park protests.

In summary, the population in the RS was mainly exposed to the frames that ignored the grievances and offered an alternative vision of socio-political conditions, while the population in the FB&H entity has been equally exposed to discrediting and supportive types of frames, as well as to a great deal of information on protesters' activities. The RS leadership has ignored and sidelined protesters' claims by shifting the discussion to the future of the RS in B&H, a topic that is highly salient in the RS.

3.6 Discussion

Automated quantitative text analysis methods have a potential to advance our understanding of framing processes and protest mobilization trends. These methods could be proven useful in integrating protest event data such as protest size and location with the other protest related attributes such as frames. In this way, the significance of protest frames and other mobilization related factors such as resources, organizational and network related structures could be tested in a more systematic way.

Overall, the topics that I have identified using the STM model mainly reflect the government frames and less so the protest activists' frames. The only topics that relate to protest participants, Topics 5 and 10, refer to protesters' actions rather than

their demands and grievances. While the frames used by the political leaders have an easily identifiable message, protesters' related topics contain words that are less illustrative of protest claims or goals. These results could be interpreted in two ways: either the government has a considerable advantage in spreading own interpretations of protest events or protest activists were unable to create credible and resonant frames that would capture enough attention to be reported by the news sources. It is possible that a lack of common vision and the presence of ethnic divides have negatively affected the efforts by the protest activists to effectively communicate their views regarding the B&H socio-political conditions and the high levels of economic and political grievances in the country.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates the usefulness of the automated data coding and analysis methods and provides detailed examination of government framing of protest events. Based on the STM model output, the government frames can be are categorized into three categories: delegitimizing (ex. calling protesters traitors), demobilizing (sympathetic statements), and alternative views (sidelining/ignoring grievances). The findings illustrate the differences in the vocabularies and the types of the frames used by the Government officials in the two B&H entities. While the RS government has mainly used the frames to shift the discussion from protest related grievances to a more salient issue such as the independence and autonomy of the RS (Topic 1), the FB&H has engaged in both, delegitimizing and sympathizing framing of the protest events. The RS officials' frames were more about building independent, stronger and better RS, without directly addressing protesters' claims. This type of the frame might have been persuasive enough to stop the RS population from protesting since

the citizens in this entity are mainly in the favour of the RS being independent from B&H. The fear of being dominated by other ethnic group/s is still present in the country due to ethnic and territorial divides. This sentiment is particularly present in the RS given that Serbs (majority population) confronted the Bosniak-Croat coalition during the 1990s conflict. Also, Serbs, have received numerous condemnations from the wider international community during and after the 1990s conflict. Thus, it is possible that some people in the RS saw the protests as a threat by the Bosniak-Croat and international community as the President Dodik claimed and decided not to participate in protests. This could also help explain why the RS government choose not to acknowledge grievances, and instead was able to either ignore or discredit protesters by calling them traitors. The differences in the RS and FB&H governments' framing of the 2014 B&H protests to some extent help explain why protests mainly emerge in FB&H, Bosniak-Croat dominated entity.

One could also argue that because the number of protest events in the RS entity was low, the RS government could afford to focus on the independence issue instead on responding to grievances. The endogeneity problem in this case could be potentially addressed by examining the levels of support that the RS President Milorad Dodik and his party enjoyed in a period of time before the protests. According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2014) report President Dodik was facing allegations of corruption and mismanagement of public funds prior to the protests and his party did not enjoy high levels of support since 2010 elections. Thus, given the weak level of support towards President Dodik's Government, the choice of the regime officials, in particular President Dodik, to re-focus the discussion from economic grievances towards the independence of the RS was most likely a strategy designed to garner more support and prevent mass anti-regime mobilisation in the RS.

I do not claim that based on the results in this study that there is a causal relationship between the government frames and protest mobilization levels observed in the RS in comparison to the FB&H. I address the potential problem of endogeneity here for the purpose of future study. I plan to further investigate the effects of government frames on mobilization levels by merging the outcomes of this analysis with the size of protests and government responses to test the proposed causal relationship.

This chapter contributes to the current literature by examining protest frames proposed by both, governments and protest activists, with a primary focus government frames. As can be seen in this study, governments utilize various framing strategies, from highlighting disruptive aspects of protests and portraying protesters as criminals, misfits and agitators to proposing alternative interpretation of issues and events that sideline grievances as it was the case in the RS. The B&H officials have also engaged in exploiting ethnic divides and spreading fear and divisions among ethnic groups. In some cases, government officials, in particular those from the FB&H also sought to align their aims with those of protesters by engaging in accommodative types of activities. Given the advantage that most governments have in spreading the information, these types of strategies can be quite effective in reducing protest mobilization potential.

Interestingly, the FB&H government has equally engaged in both, sympathizing and delegitimizing frames by acknowledging grievances and demands (Topic 2) as well as attempting to discredit the protesters (Topic 3). This type of government action is described in the protest literature as inconsistency response and is found to have a positive effect dissent, leading to an increase in mobilization levels (Lichbach 1987; Rasler 1996). Thus, it is possible that the protesters have perceived the FB&H government to be weak, considering that the acknowledgement of the

grievances has come from the top political leaders and representatives of FB&H constituent people (Croats and Bosniaks), leading to a larger mobilization in this entity. Additionally, the FB&H leaders were unable to place the blame on the outsider's influence given that the FB&H officials have positive relations with the Western states, while the RS politicians were able to evoke anti-Western sentiments due to the NATO's involvement in the bombing of the RS and Serbian territories during the 1990s conflict.

In conclusion, it appears that the Government's framing of protest events, a lack of common vision in the country, and the existence of ethnic cleavages have trumped the economic grievances and efforts to improve the conditions in the B&H. A lack of interest and motivation to join others to address political and economic issues in the country was particularly evident by the Bosnian Serb's low levels of mobilization. Given the presence of ethnically salient cleavages, post-conflict related traumas and mistrust between the RS and FB&H populations, the frames used by the RS President might have had prevented people in the RS from protesting out of fear that protests are/or could be used against the RS entity.

The findings above demonstrate that governments' verbal statements can be classified into distinct categories. The proposed categories – delegitimizing, demobilising, alternative views – emerge as the outcome of government framing of 2014 protests in B&H. It appears that similar types of frames are also used by the government officials in other states, such as Brazil and Turkey. For instance, both, Turkish and B&H leaders, have engaged in sidelining the grievances (alternative views) and delegitimizing the protest participants. Given that this study employs automated text analysis tools such as the STM, the proposed government frames could be easily tested in other cases using news reports. Thus, this study provides a

framework that could be used to evaluate government framing of protest events in other cases.

The findings in this study also provide additional contributions to the protest framing literature in relation to the frames proposed by the protest activists. While the literature provides a theoretical framework for the protest activists' frames, these types of frames are yet to be systematically evaluated using a large sample of texts. The findings in this study show that the frames proposed by protest activists appear to be less coherent and not as easily identifiable as the frames proposed by the government leaders. These findings confirm the expectations that governments might have a considerable advantage in promoting their views and framing of protest events which could have a significant effect on the mobilisation levels and movement success. In the case of B&H, the news reports were primarily about protesters engaging in violence and less so about their demands, which could have a negative effect on the overall interest to collectively mobilise against the corrupt and ineffective government. Thus, the current study illustrates the importance to taking into account both, activists' and governments' framing of protest events when examining the effect of verbal responses on mobilisation levels. Protest frames are a result of the dynamic interaction between protest activists, governments and a wider society. Significant progress has been made in the current protest literature, however, more work is needed to understand what makes people more or less likely to mobilize and join collective action. A better understanding of to the discourses surrounding grievances and goals and ways in which governments engage in framing processes, will greatly contribute to the better understanding of the dynamics of protest mobilization and state responses to dissent.

Chapter 4

Ignoring Demands: Is the *Law of Coercive Responsiveness* Wrong?

Abstract

Repression is not the only available tactic that a regime can use to respond to dissent, yet the majority of the current literature focuses on repression as the primary response. The view that governments inevitably respond to dissent with repression is referred to as the *Law of Coercive Responsiveness*. Protests do pose a threat to a regime's power, but as some are more threatening than others, a regime's responses are likely to vary. This chapter examines the conditions that shape regimes' perceived levels of threat and a choice to ignore, accommodate or repress protest events. The Mass Mobilization Data (MMD), the first and only dataset that codes various types of government responses, is used to examine a relationship between protest attributes and government responses. The results in this study show that a choice to ignore protests is the most common response, contrary to the *Law of Coercive Responsiveness* which sees repression as the dominant strategy. The results also indicate that the probability of ignoring increases as the protest size increases, contradicting another view in the literature, the *threat-response* theory which states that repression increases with an increase in threat levels (increase in the number of protest participants). The findings show that governments are more likely to ignore protests with up to 1000 participants, and more likely to accommodate than repress protests above 100 000. In addition, protests with rights related demands are most likely to be repressed, while production (wages, taxes, food costs, land issues) are most likely to be accommodated when compared to other demands.

4.1 Introduction

An estimated two million Egyptian workers engaged in more than 3000 protests for several years leading up to 2011, only to be largely ignored by the then President Hosni Mubarak's regime (Bishara 2015; Abdalla 2012). Even though pharmacists, farmers, textile workers, and others frequently gathered in front of the government offices in Cairo and demanded socioeconomic changes during the 2004-2010 period, the Government rarely responded (Bishara 2015; Abdalla 2012; Los Angeles Times 2009). The exception was a *Kefaya*, Arabic for "enough", anti-Mubarak campaign that lasted for five years between 2000-2005 and was able to secure some social and political reforms (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Interestingly, the Egyptian Government took more notice of protest activities post-2010, starting with the violent repression of the Tahrir Square protests in January 2011 (PBS 2011). Why did Egypt's historically repressive government choose to tolerate numerous mass protests prior to 2011? A lack of repression in this case is puzzling for two reasons; the regime's historical disregard for human rights and freedoms and a trend in the literature which suggests that governments tend to respond to dissent with repression (Davenport 2007). Events in Egypt imply that a government's use of repression may not be as common as the literature suggests.

Protests pose a threat to a regime's power, but as some are more threatening than others, a regime's responses are likely to vary. Despite the possibility of varied responses, the current literature on government and dissident actions mainly explores the use of repression, inferring that repression is an expected response to protest events. According to Davenport (2007), the tendency of a state to respond to contentious challenges with repression is the most consistent finding in the current literature, in fact so consistent that it verges on a law, to which he refers as *The Law*

of Coercive Responsiveness. While an aim of any state apparatus is to eliminate or reduce potential challenges to its power and to deter any such activities in the future, repression may not be the most effective or possible choice in some cases. Repression is costly and it puts a strain on a state's resources and brings into question the legitimacy of a regime to govern. For instance, the Egyptian Government's decision to violently repress the Tahrir Square protest event on 25 January 2011 backfired, resulting in a wide-spread mass mobilization within and across the country's borders (PBS 2011). Nonetheless, there are cases where swift and violent state repression ended and discouraged mass mobilization in years to come; one such example being Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989. It seems that, *The Law of Coercive Responsiveness* ("*authorities generally employ some form of repressive action to counter or eliminate the behavioural threat*") may be applicable in some cases and not others (Davenport 2007, p.7). Thus, this chapter examines the conditions that shape regimes' perceived levels of threat and subsequent responses to dissent.

Repression is not the only available tactic that a regime can use to respond to dissent, yet, the majority of the current literature focuses on repression as a single response mode (Tilly 1978; Gurr 1986; Davenport 2000; Davenport 2007; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Hendrix and Salehyan 2016). A few studies have also exclusively examined a state's choice to accede to protest demands, a response referred to in the literature on dissent as an accommodation or concession (Ryckman 2016; Steinhardt 2016). Focusing only on one type of state response limits our understanding of the conditions that increase the probability of one response over others (Franklin 2009). Studies that examine state responses beyond repression and/or accommodation are either limited to a particular region (Franklin 2009: Latin

America; Carey 2006: 6 Latin American and 3 African states), single-case studies (Rasler 1996: Iranian Revolution; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003: case of protest policing in New York State) or claim specific analyses such as Brancati's (2016) work on democracy protests. The one exception is the work of Klein and Regan (forthcoming) that explores the relationship between protest related concession and disruption costs and various state responses in a cross-national sample. They develop a composite index of concession and disruption costs, making theoretical assumptions about what constitutes low and high cost. In contrast, I explore how various protest characteristics relate to a government's choice of response. In particular, I study whether and how protest attributes such as size, demands and tactics shape governments' perceived levels of threat and consequently their choice to ignore, accommodate or repress protest events. Therefore, this chapter contributes to the current literature by presenting a systematic empirical analysis of protest event characteristics and government responses on a global sample of 161 countries between 1990-2016. For this purpose, I use the Mass Mobilization Data (MMD) by Clark and Reagan (2016), which is the first and only data to code both protest events and a wide range of government responses in one dataset.

While the current literature provides some insights into a choice to repress or accommodate protest demands, it mostly neglects the option for a state to refrain from using either response. How likely are governments to choose neither repression nor concession? Only a handful of studies primarily explore the ignore category, using mostly qualitative and case-study approaches (Bishara 2015; Yien and Cheng 2017). Moreover, the concept and measure of the ignore category is not clearly defined or agreed upon in the current literature (Franklin 2009; Bishara 2015; Yien and Cheng 2017). Thus, I provide a theoretical and an empirical overview of the ignore category

as well as analysis based discussion regarding this particular choice. Overall, in this chapter I contribute to the current literature by using a quantitative approach to assess *various* governments' responses to protest events; repression, accommodation and ignore.

It is surprising that the ignore category is rarely studied given that a choice to ignore protests may be more common, if not more common than repression and accommodation. For example, Franklin (2009) finds that in Latin America between 1981 and 1955 the ignore category represents 50% of total state responses compared to repression (30%) and concession (20%). While some protests may seem *too big to ignore*, it is possible that under certain conditions the choice to ignore a large protest may be less costly than the choice to repress or accommodate its demands. On the other hand, in some cases ignoring even small-scale protests may be costly as it could lead to an increase in protest participation, and thus, some type of responses would be a better than none. In sum, in this chapter I present a theoretical argument and empirical test of the variability in regime responses to protest events.

The sections below provide theoretical and empirical evidence, and conceptual discussion regarding the variability of government responses to protest events as well as protest event characteristics used to assess protest-related threats.

4.2 Government Responses: Repression, Accommodation or Neither?

A government's choice to repress, accommodate and/or ignore protests carries short and long-term benefits and costs (see Franklin 2009). Repression can backfire as it gives wider attention to protesters' claims and can turn public opinion against a state

as the case of 2011 Egypt protests illustrates. When used at the outset, repression can also end a challenge and discourage protests in the future as case of Bahrain shows (Cunningham et al 2017).

Another way to swiftly eliminate a protest threat is to accommodate protesters' demands. However, accommodation can be costly given the resources needed to adequately respond to demands, and this may not be a viable option for a government that lack resources. Accommodation may also encourage future protests, so even when a state has resources needed to accommodate demands, it may choose not to do so. In order to offset the costs, governments sometimes choose to respond with both accommodation and repression (Lichbach 1987) or substitute one response for another in a sequential manner. Moore (2000) Goldstone and Tilly (2001) examine a state's choice to substitute repression for accommodation and vice versa and provide valuable insight into the dynamic relationship between a state and an opposition.

Governments may also choose not to respond, neither to accommodate nor to repress. Ignoring protests may be beneficial in some situations as it can lower protesters' expectations and discourage people to participate in protests (Franklin 2009). On the other hand, by not responding, a government may appear vulnerable which can encourage more people to join protests. Also, some protests pose a more credible threat and are harder to ignore, so governments are compelled to respond either with repression and/or accommodation (Franklin 2009). Taking into the account the costs and benefits of each response, a state's choice of action is a complex decision-making process that does not only depend on the nature of a regime in power, *but* also protest event related characteristics (see Lichbach 1987; Franklin 2009; Hendrix and Salehyan 2016; Brancati 2016).

The larger the protest size, the more radical demands are and the more violent dissent becomes, the more threatening protest will seem to a government (Tilly, 1978; Gartner and Regan 1996; Lichbach 1998; Poe et al 2000). While a government can choose to repress, accommodate or in some cases even ignore these kinds of threats, the current literature suggests that government will primarily respond with repression.

According to *the Law of Coercive Responsiveness*, threats to a regime's survival will be repressed (Davenport 2007). Other researchers take a less definite position and suggest that the probability of repression increases/decreases relative to protest threat levels; the view referred to as a *threat-response* theory (Tilly, 1978; Gartner and Regan 1996; Poe et al 2000; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003). Even though past research points out that repression decreases once protest demands reach very high levels (Gartner and Regan 1996) and that repression is not the most common response (Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Franklin 2009), state repression still continues to be the focus of the majority of the studies on dissent (Carey 2006; Davenport 2007; Hendrix and Salehyan 2016).

It is plausible that violent challenges, radical demands and a large number of participants pose a greater threat to a regime's power and compel a state to rely on coercive measures to control dissent. However, it is also to be expected that, when faced with dissent, regimes will aim to employ the least costly and most effective tactics to respond to protest related threats, and that their choice of action will not solely be limited to repression.

Protest *size* is considered to greatly affect a regime's response to protests. Ryckman (2016) argues that in the case of large, nonviolent movements, governments are forced to consider granting concessions because these movements are "too large to ignore yet risky to repress" (p.5). More precisely, Brancati (2016) finds that

governments offer concessions at a higher rate when protests have more than 100 000 participants, with almost two thirds of these protests receiving concessions (p.128). In contrast, Lichbach (1998) warns that even small events can have a significant impact, with seemingly insignificant events leading to major political uprisings (p.114). It is possible that in some cases, governments will choose to repress even small-scale protests out of fear of protest escalation. For instance, the Cuban Government violently repressed a protest by the Ladies in White group in March 2010, even though only 30 people participated (Israel 2010). Thus, protest size alone may not be sufficient to account for variability in government responses. It is important to note that there are numerous challenges that come with measuring protest participation. Conflicting estimates given by protest organizers and governments, large numbers of missing cases particularly for events in rural areas, and imprecise estimates such as "hundreds" or "thousands" are some of the issues that researches struggle with when seeking to determine protest size (Biggs 2016). Thus, it is important to take into account other protest characteristics when examining states' responses to dissent.

In addition to protest size, protest *demands* are also an important indicator of protest related threats. Hendrix and Salehyan (2016) show that protests with political and ethno-religious claims are more likely to be repressed when compared to protests with economic claims. Interestingly, Hendrix and Salehyan (2016) also find that even though identity-based claims are more threatening for the survival of the regimes in Africa, repression is a more risky choice and less likely to be used in countries with a history of military factionalism. As shown in the previous chapters of this thesis, unrests along ethnic or religious lines have potential to divide and weaken an opposition and a regime's power structures (Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014) as well as

lead to a conflict on a wider scale (Syria 2011), so repression under these circumstances may not be the optimal response. It is possible that, despite the pressures that protests exert on governments, the better option in some cases is to refrain from either repression or accommodation.

While some demands are less radical and easier to accommodate, more radical claims such as the calls for regime change are less likely to result in a compromise. Gartner and Regan (1996) and Lichbach (1998) find that the more radical demands are, the higher the likelihood that they will be rejected and potentially repressed. Calls for regime change, in particular in autocracies, may signify *life and death* decisions for some regimes as the cases of 2011 regime overthrow in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt illustrate, limiting possibilities for other actions besides repression. In cases where radical demands draw large numbers of people, repression may eventually become counterproductive and lead to an overthrow of a regime. However, it is also possible that some radical demands fail to mobilize large numbers, resulting in protests being less threatening to a regime, and thus, easier to ignore. Brancati (2016) finds that a quarter of world-wide electoral claims related protests (1989-2011) were ignored despite radical demands precisely because these were small-scale protests. She provides interesting insights into ways in which protest demands interact with specific country-related characteristics to condition governments' perceptions of threat and subsequent choices of action, however, the study is primarily focused only on electoral process, and leaving aside other political events. I examine various issues such as rights-related claims, calls for reform, regime change demands as well as economy-related issues to offer a wider coverage of political conditions that countries experience.

In some instances large numbers (*size*) can be enough to evoke a desired response from a government and in others only specific actions such as the violent takeover of government-owned facilities may provoke some — even if negative — acknowledgement of grievances (*demands*). For instance, the 2009 Bagua protests in Perú were initially ignored by the government for a year despite 140 indigenous communities and around 5000 participants protesting against the government's illegal natural resource extraction from indigenous lands (Freedom House 2015, p.51). The Peruvian Government responded with violent repression only after protesters occupied state-owned facilities (Freedom House 2015). In contrast, in less than five months and with more than 500 000 participants, the Chilean 2011 nonviolent student protest movement managed to secure significant concessions and raise an awareness of educational issues on the national level (Freedom House 2015). In both cases, Chile and Perú, the protesters demanded reform of government policies, but the size and the tactics differed, which could help explain differences in these two cases. Thus, another important element of threat is use of violent and/or nonviolent tactics by protesters.

In terms of the threat levels, both violent and nonviolent protests pose a significant threat to a regime's status. Gamson (1975) suggests that violent protests pose a greater threat to a regime because of the resources needed to cope with these types of challenges. However, studies have found that nonviolent challenges are two times more successful in removing a regime from power in comparison to violent ones (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005). Nonviolent protests often mobilize more people and as the number of protest participants increases, so does people's power to successfully confront a regime. Thus, large-scale nonviolent protests may present a greater threat when compared to violent

protests, but be more risky to repress given the potential backlash against a government who confronts nonviolent challenges with violence.

Both, violent and nonviolent protests are more common in non-democratic states given the inherent problems in these types of the regimes and a lack of option to express grievances through official channels such as elections (Schock 2003). The emergence of 2011 mass public protests illustrates the extent of disillusionment with the non-democratic political systems and with a lack of possibility of change through regular political channels. Nonetheless, over the last decade both, democracies and non-democracies have experienced some type of unrest (Brancati 2016; Clark and Regan 2016). People have voiced their concerns over a variety of issues, ranging from global reactions to 2008 financial crisis to a state-level discontent regarding educational, environmental and electoral policies. Governments' responses varied from excessive use of police force to various forms of concessions, to inaction (Freedom House, 2015; Brancati 2016; Clark and Regan 2016). While, both democracies and non-democracies employ repressive tactics, democracies are less likely to engage in repressive actions in comparison to non-democracies. Democracies are expected to guarantee and respect freedoms of assembly and expression and be more responsive to their citizens' demands (Johnston, 2011). Protests in democracies are less likely to be ignored and more likely to be accommodated given that these regimes are held accountable to the electorate. Instead, protests present a more significant threat to non-democratic regimes given that these regimes hold onto power through coercive measures, and so accommodation in non-democratic states may be more costly as it would require significant changes to regimes' structures.

While a government's choice of repression or accommodation can be understood in terms of strategic and tactical advantages, a choice of ignore presents a more complex puzzle. Is ignoring an attempt to diminish a threat? Or does it signal that a threat doesn't need diminishing? Small-scale protests with minimal demands present a low threat to a regime and are probably best to be ignored. It can be argued that such cases may not require a complex decision-making calculation, and a choice to ignore may simply represent a lack of threat. For instance, Klein and Regan (forthcoming, p. 36) show that a predicted probability of ignore (disregard) increases to 68.3% when both concession and disruption costs are low, while a probability of repression and accommodation significantly decreases, with coercion being at 3.1%, accommodation 8.5% and crowd dispersal 20.2%. However, by not responding to a low level protest related threats, a regime may appear dismissive of people's genuine concerns, which in turn can fuel more anger and resentment towards a regime and lead to an increase in protest participation (Bishara 2015). While the rationale behind ignoring small-scale protests seems plausible, the benefits of not responding to large-scale protests may be less apparent. However, by choosing to ignore large-scale protests a state may avoid greater backlash and conflict escalation. Thus, the relationship between the protest size and the ignore choice may be more complex than the *threat-response* theory suggests.

With the exception of one cross-country study by Klein and Regan (forthcoming) and couple of case studies (Bishara 2015 and Franklin 2009), the discussion in the literature often centres on a government's choice to either repress or accommodate protest demands. One possible explanation for a lack of attention towards the ignore response may relate to issues of data collection and measurement. Researchers are often unable to distinguish between cases where governments

actively ignore protests and the cases where news outlets have not reported on governments' actions. In addition, there seems to be a lack of an agreement on how to conceptualize the ignore category in the handful of studies that do take into account this particular response. Bishara (2015, p.959) conceptualizes the ignore response from a perspective of protest participants, hence, ignore is any government action that appears dismissive of protest participants either through inaction or contempt. On the other hand, Cai (2010) and Yien and Cheng (2017) use the concept of tolerance to describe a regime which allows and tolerates protests only to be able to easily identify dissenters and apply proactive tactics either to discredit or payoff protesters. Other authors tend to define the tolerance/ignore category as an absence of both repression and concession (Franklin 2009). Similarly to Franklin (2009), the MMD codes the ignore category as a lack of repressive or accommodative actions (Clark and Regan 2016). I rely on the MMD definition, being the inaction/ignore category cases where a government chooses neither to repress nor to accommodate. In the following section, I show how the strategic choice to ignore protests can be integrated and tested within the theoretical bounds of the *Law of the Coercive Responsiveness* and the *threat-response* theory.

4.3 Propositions

The aim of this chapter is to examine government responses beyond repression and explore the conditions that increase the probability of repression over accommodation or a choice to ignore protest events. Repression might not be as common as the current literature suggests given human and material costs. Also, not all protest events elicit a response from a government. Thus, the following propositions take

into account the variability in government responses and the conditions that increase the probability of one response over other.

Based on the *threat-response* theory, the larger the protest *size* the more threatening protest will seem to a government, and the higher the likelihood that a government will respond with repression. Even though this proposition seems plausible, repression may not be the best option in cases when protests are "too large to ignore yet risky to repress" (Ryckman, p.5). Accommodation may be a less risky choice in those cases. On the other hand, at the point when protests are neither too small to ignore nor too large to accommodate, the best option to effectively reduce or eliminate protest-related threats may be repression. Thus, it is possible that as the protest size increases, so does the likelihood that a government will respond with repression, up until a certain point when repression becomes a more risky and a less likely choice, and instead, accommodation or a choice to ignore become more viable options. It is also possible that while some protests are best not to be ignored, others may be too small to merit a response, and so ignore might be the most optimal choice. Thus, it is important to examine alternatives to a state's choice of repression.

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Hypothesis 1a: As protest size increases, protests are more likely to be repressed than ignored.

Hypothesis 1b: As protest size increases, protests are more likely to be accommodated than repressed.

The *demand* type is also an indicator of a threat that a protest event can pose to a regime. In relation to *regime change demands*, there seems to be an agreement in the literature that these pose a significant threat to those in power (White et al. 2015; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Thus, protest evens with these types of demands are

very likely to be repressed. Interestingly, Hendrix and Salehyan (2016) show that, overall, protests with political and ethno-religious demands are more likely to be repressed when compared to protests with economic demands. In comparison, Brancati (2016) finds that economy related claims have potential to attract the most participants and that these claims are more likely to be accommodated. I propose to further test the above findings and contribute to the current literature by taking into account a variety of government responses and demands.

The demands that call for a removal of government official/s present a significant threat to a regime and may be more challenging to accommodate or ignore in comparison to other demands. The calls for a regime change are less common than other types of the demands, but are more likely to mobilise large groups of people as protesters are more confident in expressing this type of radical demand when surrounded by a large number of participants. Demands for institutional and policy reforms also present a significant threat, as these are often calls for democratisation. These types of demands are more likely to be repressed than accommodated. In comparison to the calls for the regime removal and institutional and policy reforms, the production related claims (demands for fair wages, levies, food costs and land/farm issues) are potentially more likely to be accommodated as these require less institutional changes. Production related demands, in particular wage-related protests, have a potential to mobilize large groups of people so these claims may also be less likely to be ignored and more likely to be accommodated (Brancati 2016). However, given that production-related claims could potentially mobilize large numbers of people and impose significant financial costs, it is also possible that these claims may be repressed in order to prevent large-scale mobilisation. On the other hand, rights related demands which tend to mobilize less people because their

grievances may only be related to a particular group could be less threatening simply because they do not mobilize large numbers, and thus, these demands are most likely to be ignored. The propositions below are designed to test various types of protest demands and corresponding government responses.

Hypothesis 2: Protests that demand a removal of government official/s are more likely to be repressed than ignored.

Hypothesis 3: Protests that demand institutional and policy reforms are more likely to be repressed than accommodated.

Hypothesis 4: Protests related to production demands are more likely to be accommodated than repressed.

Hypothesis 5: Protests with rights related demands are more likely to be ignored than repressed.

4.4 Data and Research Design

To test these hypotheses, I rely on the MMD dataset which provides information on protest events and government responses for 161 countries between 1990-2014, excluding the United States and Israel (Clark and Regan 2016). The MMD does not capture a large variation of protests in terms of duration, but it does capture a large variation in protest size and demand type (Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4). The majority of the protests (83.9%), last for only one day, 11.8% end within one weeks and 4.3% last anywhere from 8-939 days (Klein and Regan forthcoming, p.23). The country with highest number of protests is South Korea (251), followed by Venezuela (200), France (182), United Kingdom (174), Thailand (164) and others (see Appendix 6.6),

indicating a great variability of in the types of regimes that experience mass mobilization within the period of interest.

The MMD present several advantages compared to NAVCO 2.0 to test the theoretical argument. First, the MMD codes independent protest events with a threshold of 50 participants, which differs from NAVCO 2.0 campaign event threshold where protest events with 1000 or more participants are coded as a part of a wider coordinated, purposive and continuous maximalist campaign of resistance (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). Clark and Regan (2016) argue that 50-participants threshold is enough to capture an organized effort by an opposition. The lower threshold of protest size is relevant in this chapter, as it allows me to examine whether and how government responds to smaller-scale protest events with fewer than 1000 participants. This is helpful for understanding if and how government responses present a barrier for an emergence of larger, coordinated and sustained efforts of civil resistance, the types of events studied in the Chapter 2 of this thesis. The MMD data also codes large-scale protest events, which helps me test the *threat-response* theory propositions. Second, I can assess mass mobilization irrespective of its duration, given that MMD consider events with a minimum of one day while NAVCO2.0 aggregates the information to the year. Finally, in addition to the number of protest participants, the MMD provides information on protesters' use of violence, demands, government responses and numerous other details such as the location and the identity of those organizing a protest event (Clark and Regan 2016; Klein and Regan forthcoming).

Protest related threat indicators such as protest size and types of demands are measured at the event level, while control variables in this paper are measured at the country-level. The unit of analysis in this study is the event-country-year, and so the

number of protests in a country-year is included as an event-level control variable (Klein and Regan forthcoming). The more protests a country is experiencing, the more challenging it will be for a state to repress numerous protests, making it more likely that protests will be ignored or accommodated.

4.4.1 The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is *government response*. The government response variable in the MMD dataset is coded as a categorical variable with 7 types of government responses: accommodation, arrests, beatings, crowd dispersal mechanisms, killings, shootings and ignore. For the purposes of the analysis in this Chapter, the original variable is recoded into 3 unordered categories: ignore (1), repress (2), accommodate (3). The repression category is a combination of: arrests, beatings, crowd dispersal mechanisms, killings, and shootings. Any negotiations, meetings and concessions are defined as accommodation response. The ignore response category identifies cases where government's choice is neither repression nor accommodation to respond to protest events.

Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of these three types of responses and also instances where the protest event is inconsistent (mixture of responses to a given event) and missing. The ignore category is by far the most common government response, accounting for 52% of all the cases, which stands in contrast to the findings in the current literature. It is possible that number of ignored protest events is even larger than Figure 4.2 shows given that protests that get repressed are more likely to be reported than those that get ignored. Repression is the next most common category with 23% of the cases, followed by accommodation (7%), inconsistent

responses (6%) and missing cases (14%). Given that most protest events last about a day, the focus in this study is primarily on the cases where government uses exclusively one of the responses rather than being inconsistent (responding by using both repression and accommodation or ignore).

Figure 4.1 Frequency of Government Responses (1990-2014)



4.4.2 Explanatory Variables

The main independent variables relate to the characteristics of the protest that eventually determine the level of threat they impose on the government. I define threat by the size of protest and the types of demands. The first independent variable of interest is *protest size*. This variable is a rough estimate of the maximum number of protest participants that an event attracted over the course of its duration, grouped into categories (Figure 4.3) The variable in the model is a 7-point ordinal variable.

As before, data comes from the MMD, and as Figure 4.3 shows the majority of the protest events falling into the 100-999 and 10 001 – 100 000 protest participant category. The MMD final categorization ends at >10 000 protests, but, given the findings by Brancati (2016) which shows that accommodation is the most likely option when protests draw more than 10 000 participants, additional category is added to separate protests under and above 100 000. The protest size intervals that define categories are broad and dramatically change in size from 10 000 to 100 000, however, similar coding rules have been applied by Brancati (2016). Also, similar divisions of protest size is present in the SCAD v.3.1 dataset, which provides yearly accounts (1990-2014) of protest events and government responses for all the countries in Africa as well as Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean (Salehyan et al, 2012).

The number of cases in the MMD where the protest size is missing comes close to 48% of the sample. These percentages are comparable to the SCAD v.3.1 dataset missing protest size cases and other studies (Biggs 2016). However, the missing protest size estimates might bias the estimated relationship between protest size and government responses. In particular, the use of repression towards smaller protests is likely to be overestimated given that larger protests are likely to be reported regardless of being repressed or not. Given that the MMD contains protest events from recent history and protest organizers are often required to inform police of their intent to hold the protests, and in some cases, provide an estimate of the number of expected participants so that police can provide adequate protection, the missing cases cannot be entirely due to reporting styles or a lack of available information. It is possible that some of the cases were either small so that the protest

size was not worth mentioning or very contentious so that the government/press decided to suppress information on the protest size.

Figure 4.2 Frequency of protest size (1999-2014)



The second independent variable is protest *demand*. Based on the MMD I create a 4 variable distinguishing between (1) the calls for institutional and policy reforms (reform); (2) demands for removal of an individual or a group in a government (remove); (3) demands for social and political rights (rights); and finally (4) demands for fair wages, levies, food costs and land/farm issues (production).

Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of these four categories. The demands related to reforms are the most common type, accounting for 70% of the cases, followed by production, rights and calls for removal of government officials.

Appendix 6.7 shows the distribution of protest size for each type of demand. The 100 – 999 protest size category seems to be the most common protest mobilization level across all the demands. Protest events that call for reform primarily mobilize between 100 – 999 and 10 001 – 100 000 participants. Similar trend in mobilization is present for the production and remove related demands. Rights related demands tend to mobilize between 100-199 participants, less people in comparison to other demands where mobilization levels can reach above 100 000.

Figure 4.3 Frequency of protest demands (1990-2014)



4.4.3 Control Variables

I control for confounders that may affect the response of governments to protests. In particular, I account for regime type, use of violence by protesters, number of protests in a country/year, size of urban population and GDP per capita. *Non-democracies* are expected to primarily employ repression. I use information from Polity2 (Marshall, Keith, and Robert 2016)to create a institutional measure for the regime of a given country with a binary indicator that identifies non-democratic countries as those who receive a polity2 score of 5 or less within the 10 (full democracy) to -10 (full autocracy) range.

The MMD provides information on protesters engaging in violence against a state which could include any type of violence from riots to destruction of property to shooting at the police (Clark and Regan 2016). The *protest violence* variable is coded as a dichotomous. I control for *protest violence* since a regime is more likely repress violent protests as it is easier to justify use of repression towards violent than nonviolent protests. I also control for the *number of protests in a country/year*. The more protests a country is experiencing, the more challenging it will be for a state to repress numerous protests, making it more likely that protests will be ignored or accommodated.

Literature on nonviolent mobilization finds that the *size of the urban population* in a country is positively related to protest onset (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Dahl, et al. 2014). Therefore, I control for the size of urban population as a factor that may influence government response to protest using the updated data, 1948-2014 from Gleditsch (2002) project. Finally, I control for the economic situation of a country by adding an indicator GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2002) given

that richer non-democracies are expected to be more repressive. Both variables, *GDP per capita* and *urban population* are logged due to severe nonlinearity.

Given the nature of the dependent variable *government response*, I estimate a multinomial logit model with standard errors clustered by country to model government response to protest events as a state chooses between a set of alternatives; to ignore, repress or accommodate a protest event (Venables and Ripley 2002). The multinomial logit model assumes that these are plausibly distinct choices, meaning that a relative choice does not depend on what other available choices are. In other words, a state's choice of repression won't change regardless weather accommodation or ignore is an option or not. A state's choice of an action is a part of a deliberate and strategic decision-making process, and so a choice to repress a protest do not necessarily depend on whether accommodation or ignore are available choices or not. For instance, a state might choose to use available resources to repress rather than accommodate regardless of how easy or difficult it would be to concede to protesters demands. This property of the multinomial logit is known as the independence *of irrelevant alternatives* (IIA). The tests such as Hausman-McFadden and Small-Hsiao are often used to test IIA assumption. Cheng and Long (2007) run a series of Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate these tests and conclude that the performance is unsatisfactory. Klein and Regan (forthcoming) come to a similar conclusion. Cheng and Long (2007) suggest that the structure of the independent variables affects both tests. Allison (2012) proposes that in the models where one or more predictors are categorical, IIA tests are not useful. The model in this chapter has several categorical predictors.

4.5 Results

Table 4. 1 provides a set of regression coefficients where 2 levels of government responses – ignore and accommodation responses are compared to a baseline category *repress.* Repression response is used as a baseline category in order to test the *threat-response* theory propositions, which suggest that protest events on a low scale of contention (e.g. small protests) are more likely to be ignored, while those on a high scale of contention (e.g. large protests) are more likely to be repressed. In addition, the baseline repression allows for comparisons between repression and accommodation which is a question of great interest in the academic, activist and policy communities.

Table 4.1 Multinomial Logit Model

	Government Response: ignore, accommodate, repress (baseline category)							
	ignore	accommodate	ignore	accommodate	ignore	accommodate	ignore	accommodate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
100-999	0.197*	0.235					0.186	0.224
	(0.102)	(0.184)					(0.117)	(0.194)
1000-1999	0.342***	0.252					0.332**	0.287
	(0.116)	(0.212)					(0.134)	(0.223)
2000-4999	0.522***	-0.248					0.542***	-0.181
	(0.132)	(0.277)					(0.153)	(0.288)
5000-10000	0.614***	0.511*					0.477**	0.512*
	(0.164)	(0.280)					(0.186)	(0.296)
10001-100000	1.108***	1.040***					0.947***	0.999***
	(0.120)	(0.202)					(0.137)	(0.215)
> 100000	1.700***	1.811***					1.241***	1.351***
	(0.282)	(0.384)					(0.299)	(0.400)
Reform			0.099	-0.538***			0.021	-0.623***
			(0.123)	(0.204)			(0.141)	(0.216)
Remove			0.415***	-0.050			0.197	-0.275
			(0.153)	(0.271)			(0.177)	(0.288)
Rights			-0.271*	-0.238			-0.146	-0.125
			(0.142)	(0.250)			(0.163)	(0.261)
Production			0.203	0.666***			0.201	0.654***
			(0.124)	(0.209)			(0.141)	(0.219)
Protest violence					-2.780***	-2.282***	-2.737***	-2.239***
					(0.098)	(0.189)	(0.100)	(0.192)
Non-Democracy	-0.797***	-0.880***	-0.819***	-0.908***	-1.010***	-1.099***	-0.946***	-1.022***
	(0.107)	(0.222)	(0.106)	(0.223)	(0.117)	(0.226)	(0.119)	(0.230)
Urban Population $_{log}$	-0.251***	-0.242***	-0.214***	-0.212***	-0.145***	-0.140***	-0.166***	-0.167***
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.040)

GDP per capita $_{log}$	0.317***	0.092	0.333***	0.086	0.200***	-0.012	0.179***	-0.070
	(0.034)	(0.057)	(0.034)	(0.057)	(0.038)	(0.059)	(0.039)	(0.061)
Constant	0.125	-0.032	-0.032	0.227	1.188***	0.837	1.084***	1.403**
	(0.316)	(0.528)	(0.326)	(0.548)	(0.343)	(0.526)	(0.390)	(0.603)
N	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997
Akaike Inf. Crit.	8,001.574	8,001.574	8,040.975	8,040.975	7,099.480	7,099.480	6,947.088	6,947.088

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Based on the results in Figures 4.2, 4.5, 4.6 and the Table 4.1, ignore category is more common than repression, contradicting the *Law of Coercive Responsiveness* which claims that repression is the expected response to dissent. The results also challenge the assumptions of the *threat-response* theory which states that repression increases with an increase in threat levels (increase in protest size). The results in Table 4.1, Model 1 and Model 7, show the opposite – as protest size increases, governments are more likely to ignore than repress protest events. The analyses in this chapter bring into question the *Law of Coercive Responsiveness* and the *threat-response* theory propositions and reveal that repression is not as common as the current literature suggests.

Model 1 shows that governments are likely to choose to ignore than repress protests when the size of protests goes above 100 participants. Model 7, which in addition to the regime type, urban population and the GDP per capita also controls for whether the protests were violent or not shows that governments are likely to ignore than repress protest events with 1000 or more participants. Model 7 confirms that nonviolent protests that reach above 1000 participants are more likely to be ignored than repressed. The results in Model 1 and 7 do not provide support for Hypothesis 1a which proposes that protests are more likely to be repressed than ignored as protest

size increases. The choice to ignore rather than repress protest events as their size increases is consistent across the models. This is contrary to the current literature, in particular, the *threat-response* theory which suggests that repression increases with an increase in threat levels, measured as an increase in protest size numbers. It is important to note that events that get repressed are more likely to have the number of participants reported by the press than those that get ignored, thus, the missing data should skew the bias towards the repress category and overestimate the use of repression rather than overestimate the use of ignore option. These results suggest that it is also important to take into account the types of protest demands in addition to protest size when evaluating governments' responses.

Models 2 and 8 provide support for Hypothesis 1b which proposes that as the protest size increases, protests are more likely to be accommodated than repressed. Model 2 results indicate that accommodation becomes a more likely choice when compared to repression once protests reach 5000 participants.

Model 3 shows that demands for removal of government officials are more likely to be ignored. This finding is contrary to the expectations and does not provide support for Hypothesis 3. Interestingly, these results change to non-significant once the model 7 controls for the type of the protest.

The results in Model 4 and 8 show that protests that demand reforms are more likely to be repressed than accommodated which provides support for Hypothesis 3. The results in Models 4 and 8 also provide support for Hypothesis 4 which proposes that protests with production related demands are more likely to be accommodated than repressed.

The results in Model 3 and 7 do not provide support for Hypothesis 5. The rights related demands are more likely to be repressed than ignored according to the

Model 3. The results become non-significant once the Model 7 controls for whether the protests were violent or not. Rights related demands that become or are violent from the start are most likely separatist demands. These types of demands are not coded in the MMD data, and this might help explain non-significant results.

The expectation that governments are less likely to repress protests in countries with a larger percentage of urban population was not supported by the results, showing the opposite, with the repression being more likely than ignore and accommodation options. The effects of the GDP per capita were as expected in relation to repression, with richer non-democracies being more repressive, but less clear in relation to accommodation, with the results being non-significant (Models 2, 4, 6, 8).

Table 4. 1 presents the significance levels and the direction of the effect explanatory variables have on *government response.* In order to better understand the relationship between protest characteristics and government responses, I estimate substantive effects for the two main independent variables (protest size and demands). Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the predicted probabilities for each category of the dependent variable (*government response*), while holding constant *urban population, GDP per capita and N protests* their means and other variables at median (*regime type, use of violence*), with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 4.5 shows that the predicted probability of a government's choice to ignore protests increases with protest size (55% to 76%), while the probability of repression decreases as protests get bigger (37% to 16%). There does not appear to be a clear pattern regarding the use of accommodation in relation to protest size and confidence intervals are too wide.

Figure 4.6 indicates that the production related demands have the highest probability of being ignored when compared to other demands, while rights related demands are least likely to be ignored. In contrast, predicted probability of repression is highest for rights related demands (37%), followed by calls for a removal of regime officials (32%), reform related demands (26%) and production having the lowest probability of being repressed (22%). The production related demands are most likely to be accommodated when compared to other demands. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show that ignore and repress options are utilized by governments more so than accommodation, with ignore still being the most dominant category across the all protest size categories and all demands.

The results in this chapter provide insights into governments' perceptions of threat levels in relation to protest events and distinct cost-benefit calculations when it comes to choosing one type of response over others. The results indicate that governments are more likely to overall ignore majority of the protests in hope to avoid costs and risks related to repression.

Figure 4.4. Predicted probabilities of government responses across protest size categories. 95 % confidence intervals.



Figure 4.5 Predicted probabilities of government responses across protest demand categories. 95 % confidence intervals.



4.6 Robustness Checks

Lichbach (1987) and (Rasler 1996) examine a government's choice to respond to protests with a combination of tactics and refer to it as the inconsistency category. They both find that find that a government inconsistency increase dissent. The inconsistency category is used in this study as a robustness check (see Appendix 6.9). The results do not significantly change with inclusion of the inconsistency category in relation to the ignore-repression comparison. The only difference in these analyses appears to be in the ignore-accommodation category in relation to the protest size. Governments are more likely to accommodate small and large scale protests, while the results are non-significant for medium range protests (2000-10 000).

The ethnic diversity index (ED), based on the EPR 2014 dataset (Vogt et al. 2015) was included as another robustness check. Ethnic divisions in a country shape government responses to protest events. Hendrix and Salehyan (2016) show that ethno-religious claims are less likely to be repressed by regimes with a history of military factionalism. The authors suggest that potentials for backlash and divisions within regimes' structures are greater in these types of regimes, and so repression is a risky choice. Similarly, I argue that in cases where population is divided along ethnic lines, nonviolent protests could escalate into violent conflict if a government chooses to respond with repression as the example of Syria suggests. Even if nonviolent, mass scale mobilisation presents security risks in ethnically divided states. In such cases, governments might refrain from using repression to avoid conflict escalation as well as to evade risks of being removed from power. Thus, it is possible that in ethnically diverse and divided states, governments are less likely to repress and more likely to either ignore or accommodate protest demands. This could skew the results in favour of ignore or accommodate category, and so the ED index is used for

additional robustness checks (see Appendix 6.10). The results do not significantly change with inclusion of the ED index in relation to the ignore-repression comparison. The only difference in these analyses appears to be in the ignore-accommodation category in relation to the protest size. When controlling for the ED, governments are more likely to accommodate small and large scale protests, while the results are non-significant for medium range protests (2000-10 000).

4.7 Discussion

This chapter provides a systematic analysis of government responses to protest events and extends the existing frameworks on protests and state responses. The dissent-state response discourse in the current literature is predominantly shaped by the *Law of Coercive Responsiveness* and the *threat-response* theory. This chapter questions the applicability of these frameworks by incorporating other government responses such as ignore and accommodate category.

While both, the *Law of Coercive Responsiveness* and the *threat-response* theory rely heavily on drawing a relationship between protest threats and governments' use of repression they seem to ignore some and favour other dimensions of protest related threats. They define threat as a visible physical manifestation of protest numbers (protest size) and protesters' pursuit of radical demands such as regime change. The idea is that the larger the protest size, the more threatening protest event and the higher likelihood that a state will respond with repression (Tilly 1978). While the number of protest participants is a valid indicator of possible threats that the protesters pose to a regime's power, there are other types of threats that are less visible, but possibly equally challenging to those in power. For instance, resistance against Suharto's authoritarian rule in Indonesia was facilitated

by a large and diverse coalition of individuals and organizations, who, in addition to coming out to the streets in large numbers, were able to develop stable and resistant networks that eventually proved to be as important as the numbers of protest participants (Boudreau 2000). Well-organized networks and effective leadership can present a great level of threat to a regime in power.

Demands and protest size shape governments' perceived levels of threat to a certain level. However, what current literature and available data lacks is a more detailed assessment of organizations and networks involved in anti-regime resistance. In my future work, I plan to incorporate information on organizational structures that facilitate and sustain protest activities. The main aim of this chapter was to fill the gap in the current literature by investigating variability of government responses, in particular the ignore category, in a more systematic and empirical manner.

In addition to the data collection and variable operationalization issues (threat levels), the studies on protests and state responses suffer from a serious problem of endogeneity. Protest events and state repression can be a cause and a consequence of each other. For instance, if a state chooses to repress a particular protest event, and if the repression backfires, more people will join protest activities, which leads to an increase in protest size. Given the unit of analysis in this study, event-country-year, the endogeneity might not be a problem in this study. The MMD data codes an emergence of an independent protest event and a government reaction to each particular event. There can be more than 1 protest event that emerges in a country in a day/week/month/year, and a government response for each event is coded accordingly. Also, protest events in this study emerge for a short period of time, with 83.9% of all MMD protest last one day. The MMD data permits examination of the

direct relationship: protest action – government reaction. Thus, the feedback effect, action-reaction, is not an issue in this study.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter shows that a regime's choice to ignore protests is more common than both repression and accommodation. The findings bring into questions both, the *Law of the Coercive Responsiveness which claims that* repression is inevitable,, and the *threat-response* theory which claims that repression increases with increase in threat levels. Protest size is considered to be an indicator of threat levels, and thus, according to the *threat-response* theory, an increase in the number of protest participants should lead to an increase in use of repression. The results in this chapter show otherwise – ignore is the most dominant category.

The findings show that a government's choice to ignore protests, is a very common response to protest events, in particular when protest increases in size (number of participants). Interestingly, regimes are also more likely to ignore protests that call for a removal of state officials.

In this chapter I show that governments have a repertoire of choices and may decide to ignore mass mobilization more frequently than repress and/or accommodate it. The results show that protest size and the type of demands affect governments' responses to dissent. In particular, an increase in protest size has a positive effect on a probability of ignoring and a negative effect on a probability of government repression. This is consistent with the literature on costs of repression, showing than violently repressing large number of protesters may encourage further mobilization.

In addition, results show the importance of distinguishing between the types of demands as a proxy for how threatened a government must feel by the popular mobilization. Demands for rights are more likely to be repressed when compared to calls for a removal of government officials. It is possible that rights related claims are more likely to be met with repression when compared to other responses because governments tend to consistently target particular groups that express rights-related grievances. Groups with limited political and social rights are more likely to be targeted by a government and likely to be successfully repressed given their already weak position in a society. Instead, calls for a removal of government officials and reform may be more likely to be ignored because these demands can potentially mobilize more people given the cross-cutting nature of the grievances. Production related claims (wages, taxes and land regulations) seem to be least threatening and, thus, are more likely to be accommodated than ignored.

While repression has been considered the dominant strategy in response to dissent, the literature on government responses also points out to the negative consequences of repression and how this affects the rational calculation for choosing this response. Even so, this is one of the first studies in the current literature that shows that government may instead decide to ignore protests in the hope that this response will generate less costs than the alternatives (repress or accommodate). In other words, a choice to ignore protest demands is a part of a strategic government action and when examined together with accommodation and repression, provides a more complete understanding of government actions towards protest events.

Thus, this chapter contributes to the current literature by providing theoretical and empirical support that protest attributes such as size and demands

create a particular set of conditions under which governments are more or less likely to choose to ignore, repress or accommodate protests.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Conclusion

This PhD thesis explores barriers to nonviolent resistance and state responses to dissent. Nonviolent resistance tactics are being frequently used to overthrow oppressive and corrupt leaders around the globe. The surge in protest mobilization in 2011 had even prompted Time magazine to declare "The Protester" to be the Person of the Year (Stengel 2011). The belief that change is possible through collective action plays an important role in social and political life of both, individuals and states. Thus, barriers that prevent people from engaging in a collective resistance against an abusive and repressive state apparatus are worthy of a scholarly pursuit. In this thesis I explore ethnic divisions, as one of the barriers to nonviolent mobilization. I also examine a wide range of state responses to dissent to fill the gap in the current literature that primarily focuses on a government's use of repression in relation to dissent.

The second chapter of this thesis connects political psychology, collective action and protest literature to examine factors that affect coordination and cooperation efforts when initiating large-scale nonviolent campaigns against a state. It also connects studies on nonviolent campaigns with the literature on ethnicity. We argue that a lack of common ties and existence of ethnic cleavages makes cooperation more difficult, resulting in additional barriers for mass mobilization in ethnically diverse non-democracies. While an alliance of ethnically diverse groups is possible, forming a coalition in cases where negative intergroup perceptions stem from decades of ethnically-based depravations has proven to be a challenging task – the case of 2011 uprisings in Syria turning into a civil war. Large scale, organized, purposive and coordinated nonviolent campaigns might be particularly difficult to initiate in

non-democracies as these types of regimes have a potential to deepen inter-group animosities. Access to power and resources in non-democracies is largely organized along ethnic lines and these types of conditions can only worsen ethnic group relations and collective action potentials.

We find that that ethnic diversity alone does not negatively affect nonviolent campaign onset and that the effect of ethnicity is conditional on the regime type. The results show that the nonviolent campaign onset is less likely in ethnically diverse non-democracies. The second chapter contributes to the current literature on protest in the following ways: 1) shows that ethnicity plays a significant role in other political contexts besides violent conflict – namely nonviolent mass mobilization; 2) ethnic divides have a potential to affect cooperation and coordination needed for the emergence of nonviolent anti-regime campaigns; 3) proposes that ethnicity should be considered in the literature on nonviolent dissent as an important organizational type of structure that can either be a resource or a curse for those who seek to initiate a nonviolent resistance against a state.

Nonviolent resistance campaigns attract various individuals, organizations and civil society groups. The participants differ in terms of their interests, resources, and commitments to campaign goals. The dynamics through which these actors overcome their diverging views and come to a common understanding of grievances and goals is not well explored in the current literature. The deliberation over strategies and tactics is an important part of building a nonviolent civil resistance campaign, yet the existing datasets do not provide information on how various participants form coalitions and leadership structures that spearhead a campaign. The current literature lacks theoretical and empirical discussion about ways in which protest participants resolve coordination and cooperation dilemmas. The analyses in

the chapter two provide a broad comparison between regime type and ethnic diversity, but a detailed knowledge of the type of organisations involved would help better explain why some campaigns succeed to overcome coordination problems while others fail. Organisational level data could also help provide a better understanding on why ethnicity matters more in some contexts and not others. It could also help policy makers and activists discern which types of organisations are better suited to overcome collective action problems. In my future work I plan to focus more on organisational level data. In particular, I plan to utilise the Governmental Incompatibilities Data Project (GIDP) dataset, which seeks to provide cross-country information on organizations making maximalist claims over government during the 1960-2012 period (Cunningham et al. 2017).

The third chapter of this thesis focuses on government framing of protest events. Governments rely on various tactics to undermine and effectively demobilize protests. Physical acts of repression, accommodation and/or ignoring are often accompanied or preceded by various statements made by regime officials regarding protest participants or their demands. Even though government officials often intimidate and discredit protests by issuing dismissive, condescending or threatening statements, these verbal acts are rarely studied in the current protest literature. In addition, the protest framing theories are mainly developed from the perspective of protest participants. The framing literature contains a vast amount of work that discusses framing processes and steps that protest activists take to mobilize the masses, but it does not offer much insight into government frames of protest events. Given that governments have a considerable advantage in spreading information, frames articulated by political leaders could have a greater influence on protest

mobilization. Thus, in third chapter I examine the types of government frames and discuss how these could potentially relate to protest mobilization levels.

I focus on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina to examine the government frames that emerged as a response to 2014 spring protests, propose a categorization of these frames and discuss potential effects of government framing on protest participation. I collect my own data using the INFOBIRO (2015) database, a source of news reports in the local language that were published during the spring of 2014. I use topic models, automated text analysis approach, to *discover* the narratives (frames) that have emerged during the protest period. I find that the Bosnia and Herzegovina's officials have predominantly used the following types of frames: delegitimizing (ex. calling protesters traitors, hooligans), demobilizing (sympathetic statements – ex. saying that protests are justified), and alternative views (sidelining/ignoring grievances by discussing more salient issues).

The government officials from the Republic of Srpska, one of Bosnia and Herzegovina's entities (areas) have primarily used the types of frames that shift the discussion from protest related grievances to a more salient ethnic issue such as the independence and autonomy of the Republic of Srpska (alternative views). In contrast, the officials from the other Bosnia and Herzegovina's entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have used delegitimizing and sympathizing types of frames to respond to 2014 spring protests. This difference in the types of frames presents an interesting puzzle since the number of protest events and protest participant in the Republic of Srpska was much lower in comparison to the Federation entity. The relationship between the government frames and protest mobilization levels in Bosnia and Herzegovina is primarily discussed in exploratory terms, with an aim to examine causal effects in the future work. The primary aim of chapter three

was to *uncover* the types of discourses surrounding protest events (topics/frames) and propose categorization of government frames as this is something that is missing in the current literature on dissent.

While 2014 protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina are well-suited to study the effects of ethnic divides on protest mobilisation, the country's unique political and territorial structure presents challenges for comparative analyses. This issue could be remedied by taking into account variables such elections, incumbent years in an office and influence that government officials have over media. In my future work, I plan to examine if and how the proposed types of government frames can be applied to other cases.

The fourth and final analysis chapter examines government responses to protest events. Similarly to the chapter two, it provides a systematic empirical analysis of the cases of interest, but it focuses on various types of protest events, while chapter two only examines large-scale nonviolent campaigns. The fourth chapter examines government responses and their perception of protest threat levels which can range from protest events that mobilize 50 people to the protests that mobilize above 10 000 and up to 1 million participants. The aim is to widen and test the propositions in the current literature on what constitutes a threat by incorporating other types of regime responses in addition to repression. The current literature considers repression to be the most common choice and it rarely acknowledges the possibility of government ignoring protest demands. The choice to accommodate protest demands has received some attention in the current literature, but not as nearly as much as repression.

I find that, contrary to the claims in the literature, a choice to ignore protests is the most common response, followed by repression and accommodation. I also find

that governments are more likely to ignore protests with 1000 or more participants, and more likely to accommodate than repress protests above 5000. When it comes to the type of the protest demands, governments are more likely to repress protest events that call for rights for minorities and excluded groups in comparison to other types of demands. This finding is particularly relevant for the protest organisers as it indicates that rights related protests require a greater amount of resources to withstand repression. One way to diminish a threat of government repression would be to initially demand less radical changes (ex. labour and wages) and progressively increase pressure on governments to improve rights of aggrieved groups. In addition, policy makers who work on the advancement of human rights could potentially consider introducing additional protective mechanisms for marginalized groups and minorities whose right to protest is often violated. Thus, the findings in this chapter provide important insights into protest characteristics and government responses that could be useful to academics and activists.

To conclude, the findings in this thesis provide insights into barriers to nonviolent civil resistance as well as state responses to protest related challenges. The second chapter demonstrates that ethnicity matters in other political contexts besides civil war and violent uprisings. Ethnicity also plays an important role in nonviolent conflict, namely presenting a barrier for initiation of large-scale nonviolent resistance against a regime. Ethnic divides increase cost of cooperation and present a barrier for mass resistance, in particular in non-democratic states. The third chapter further explores the role of ethnic divides and shows how these could potentially be used to undermine nonviolent mobilization. This chapter also provides valuable insights into verbal responses (frames) that governments use to respond to dissent. And finally, the fourth chapter further contributes to the current literature on

government responses and dissent by taking into consideration a long ignored category – a government's choice to ignore protest events.

Most importantly, this thesis illustrates negative effects of ethnic divides and the ways in which exploitation of the salient ethnic categories can pose a national and international security risks. In countries where ethnicity trumps grievances such as poverty, unemployment, and inequality, the potentials for intergroup conflict escalation are high. Initiating mass mobilization, even nonviolent resistance, in societies where one's identity comes before one's financial and personal security is a highly risky action. The example of Syria should be a warning to policy makers and activists of the dangers that mass mobilization of people poses in countries where ethnicity is politicized. The recommendation for policy makers and activists who seek a change is to first develop stable organizational structures and networks that involve diverse groups of people before engaging in any type of a confrontation with a more powerful and better informed state apparatus.

The final policy recommendation of this thesis is for the activists and lawmakers who seek to protect people's rights of assembly and association is to observe and understand various tactics that governments employ to diminish dissent. While protesters are rightfully fearful of a more powerful state apparatus, repressive tactics are not the only way in which governments can undermine dissent. For instance, governments around the world are increasingly using anti-protest laws to deter protest activities. These types of actions are becoming more common responses to protest actions in democracies as well as non-democracies according to the Freedom House 2015 report. Changes in protest laws can also reflect a state's perception of the threat and present a novel dimension to be explored within the *threat-response* theory framework. Academics and activists need to better understand

other types of government responses in order to positively influence policy debate and successfully engineer a wider societal change.

Dissent generates thought-provoking debates as movement participants and authorities contest their actions and goals in a public sphere. Activists face numerous moral and political dilemmas as they engage in a deliberation over strategies and tactics of resistance. Similarly, authorities are forced to reflect upon their course of action as they respond to uprisings. This thesis explores conditions that shape protest events using a mixture of analytical approaches, supervised (logistic regression) and unsupervised models (topic models) to achieve its research aims. This thesis also suggests avenues for future work in the literature on dissent and government responses.

Appendix

Appendix 6. 1 Onset of nonviolent campaigns (NVC) in a country-year, ethnic diversity (ED) levels and regime type (polity2 scores). The y axis presents country codes and years where we observe the onset of nonviolent campaign. The x axis presents the levels of ethnic diversity (0-lowest, 1-highest). The y axis is ordered by the values of x axis. The colour of the dots indicates the regime type (dark blue are countries with high scores on Polity2 – autocratic regimes)



Appendix 6.2 Robustness Check. Onset of nonviolent campaigns (NVC) in a country-year, with Freedom House (FH) civil liberties scores.

FH_1 is a baseline category - wide range civil liberties protected. FH_2 weaker protection.FH_3, 4, 5 moderate protection. FH_6 very restricted civil liberties. FH_7 have few or no civil liberties, no freedom of expression or association, no protection of the rights of detainees.

	Dependent variable: NVC onset (0/1)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ethnic Diversity (ED)	0.014	0.170	-0.730		1.000	1.100
	(0.470)	(0.520)	(0.550)		(1.100)	(1.100)
Excluded population		-0.410	-0.560			-0.380
		(0.610)	(0.670)			(0.660)
Autocracy				0.610	1.600**	1.600**
				(0.380)	(0.690)	(0.690)
Urban population $_{log}$			0.350***	0.360***	0.350***	0.340***
			(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.078)
GDP $_{per\ capita\ log}$			-0.080	-0.028	-0.041	-0.041
			(0.130)	(0.120)	(0.130)	(0.130)
FH_2			-14.000	-14.000	-14.000	-14.000
			(701.000)	(705.000)	(705.000)	(705.000)
FH_3			2.200**	2.000*	1.700	1.800
			(1.100)	(1.100)	(1.100)	(1.100)
FH_4			3.200***	2.700**	2.500**	2.500**
			(1.100)	(1.100)	(1.100)	(1.100)
FH_5			2.700**	2.100*	1.800	1.800
			(1.100)	(1.100)	(1.100)	(1.100)
FH_6			2.400**	1.600	1.400	1.400
			(1.100)	(1.200)	(1.200)	(1.200)
FH_7			2.500**	1.800	1.500	1.600
			(1.100)	(1.200)	(1.200)	(1.200)
ED * Autocracy					**-2.400***	**-2.300***
					(1.200)	(1.200)
Constant	-4.300***	-4.300***	-8.700***	-9.500***	-9.500***	-9.400***
	(0.220)	(0.220)	(1.600)	(1.600)	(1.700)	(1.700)
Observations	4,658	4,658	4,658	4,658	4,658	4,658
Log Likelihood	-334.000	-333.000	-303.000	-303.000	-300.000	-300.000
AIC	671.000	673.000	627.000	627.000	624.000	625.000
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 6.3 Onset of nonviolent campaigns (NVC) in a country-year with cubic polynomials included to control for temporal dependence

	Dependent variable: NVC onset (0/1)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ethnic Diversity (ED)	-0.001	0.197	-0.043		1.987**	2.059**
	(0.439)	(0.479)	(0.494)		(0.970)	(0.962)
Excluded population		-0.540	-0.322			-0.506
		(0.574)	(0.602)			(0.607)
Autocracy				1.186***	2.345***	2.329***
				(0.318)	(0.578)	(0.574)
Urban population $_{log}$			0.358***	0.388***	0.366***	0.362***
			(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.071)
GDP $_{per\ capita\ log}$			-0.167*	0.016	0.057	0.053
			(0.100)	(0.107)	(0.107)	(0.107)
t	-0.002	-0.001	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.003
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
t ^ 2	-0.00004	-0.00004	-0.0001	-0.00004	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
t ^ 3	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)	(0.00000)
ED*Autocracy					-2.916***	-2.786**
					(1.094)	(1.094)
Constant	-4.349***	-4.331***	-6.169***	-8.706***	-9.645***	-9.546***
	(0.294)	(0.294)	(0.885)	(1.046)	(1.174)	(1.176)
Observations	6,203	6,203	6,203	6,203	6,203	6,203
Log Likelihood	-390.491	-390.025	-377.638	-369.968	-366.192	-365.829
AIC	790.981	792.049	771.276	753.936	750.385	751.657
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 6.4 The dominant topics in the corpus and the three most prominent topic words. Purple indicates translation from Bosniak/Croat/Serbian into English Language.



Topic 1 Top Words: RS independence
Highest Prob: Dodik, president, peoples, emphasized, pointed out, FBH, Milorad
FREX: confidence, independence, international, Dodik, pointed out, Banjaluci, referendum
Lift: analysis, autonomy, Drini, energetic, euro, fund, church

Topic 2 Top Words: BH GOV supports protests
Highest Prob: FBH, protests, Izetbegovic, president, Komsic, protests, presidency
FREX: program, Vucic, Komsic, needed, meeting, injustice, Milanovic
Lift: line, conflict, corruption, inter-ethnic, inter-religious, peaceful, national

Topic 3 Top Words: FBH GOV discredits protests
Highest Prob: government, cantons, citizens, police, demonstrators, government,
FREX: Nefic, Lipovaca, Konjuha, last night, street, workers, drugs
Lift: hungry, spokesperson, rowdy, Konjuha, traffic, found, last night

Topic 4 Top Words: elections
Highest Prob: elections, Dodik ,RSu , RSa , fbih , elections , election
FREX: RSU , extraordinary , choice, associate, RSa, elections, opposition
Lift: executive, maintain, trying, transferring, engagement, central, guarantees

Topic 5 Top Words: protesters actions
Highest Prob: government, citizens, FBH, presidency, building, demonstrator, cantons
FREX: zdk, municipality, fire, demonstrators, attack, outside, cantonal
Lift: give, main, citizen, come out, Kalesiji, Marsala

Topic 6 Top Words: international community
Highest Prob: Sarajevo, community, international police, HDZ,
FREX: paddi , Ashdown , Bosna , transferred , Radoncic
Lift: affirmed , actors , alternative , anti-bureaucratic , Ashdown

Topic 7 Top Words: RS GOV discredits protests
Highest Prob: republic, srpska, government, Dodik, republic, srpska, citizens
FREX: republic, srpska, enemies, numerous, conspiracy, story, republic

Lift: nongovernmental, theory, conspiracy, argument, Dodikov's, traitors

Topic 8 Top Words: international community

Highest Prob: protest , government , citizens , mujkic , protests , politicians , citizens
FREX: Mujkic ,kim, Asim , Inzko , politicians , democracy , presidenc
Lift: furniture ,Inzko , the possible , the next , incredibly , presidency , subas

Topic 9 Top Words: security

Highest Prob: sda , security , Kapun , Minister , Radoncic , izetbegov , home
FREX: security, Radoncic , Minister, home, resignation, resig
Lift: Radoncic , dismissed, bevanda , davolom , electrical compnay, formed , voted

Topic 10 Top Words: RS war veterans

Highest Prob: citizens, RSa, protest, government, protest, fighters, power
FREX: elements, communities, return, soldiers, veterans ,labor , came
Lift: former, work, anger, especially, huge ,pomcari, kind

Bosniak/Croat/Serbian Language

Topic 1 Top Words:
Highest Prob: dodik, predsjednik, naroda, naglasio, istakao, fbih, milorad
FREX: povjerenj, samostalnost, medunarodnog, dodik, naglasio, banjaluci, referendum
Lift: analizu, autonomiju, drini, energetik, evra, fonda, hramu
Score: aktivno, aldin, alij, analizira, analizu, angazovanj, angazovanju

Topic 2 Top Words:
Highest Prob: fbih, protesta, izetbegov, predsjednik, komsic, protesti, predsjednistva
FREX: program, vucic, komsic, trebao, sastanka, nepravd, milanov
Lift: crtu, konflikt, lopovluka, meduetnicki, medureligijskog, mirnih, nacionalnog
Score: agencijama, aldin, alij, analizira, analizu, angazovanj, angazovanju

Topic 3 Top Words:
Highest Prob: vlade, kantona, gradana, policija, demonstranata, vlada, policij
FREX: nefic, lipovaca, konjuha, sinoc, ulici, radnicima, droga
Lift: gladn, glasnogovornik, izgrednika, konjuha, prometa, pronadena, sinoc
Score: agencijama, aktivno, aldin, alij, analizira, analizu, angazovanj

Topic 4 Top Words:
Highest Prob: izbora, dodik, rsu, rsa, fbih, izbori, izbor
FREX: rsu, vanrednih, izbora, vanredni, rsa, izbori, opozicij
Lift: izvrsnog, odrz, pokusava, preno, angazovanju, centralna, garancij
Score: agencijama, aktivno, aldin, alij, analizira, analizu, angazovanj

Topic 5 Top Words:
Highest Prob: vlade, gradana, fbih, predsjednistva, zgrade, demonstranti, kantona
FREX: zdk, opstin, pozar, demonstranti, napad, ispr, kantonaln
Lift: dajt, glavnog, gradanin, gradanki, izaci, kalesiji, marsala
Score: agencijama, aktivno, aldin, alij, argument, bacali, bacila

Topic 6 Top Words: international community
Highest Prob: sarajevu, zajednic, medunarodn, policija, hdz, tim, njegov
FREX: britanski, lord, paddi, ashdown, hercegovci, prebacio, radoncicu
Lift: afirmiral, akterima, alternativcima, alternativn, antibirokratska, ashdown, ashdownu
Score: afirmiral, agencijama, akterima, alternativcima, alternativn, analizira, antibirokratska

Topic 7 Top Words:
Highest Prob: republik, srpske, vlast, dodik, republici, srpskoj, gradana
FREX: republik, srpske, neprijatelja, mnogi, zavjer, pricu, republici
Lift: nevladinih, teorija, zavjer, argument, dodikova, izdajnici, izdajnicima
Score: agencijama, aktivno, aldin, alij, analizira, analizu, angazovanj

Topic 8 Top Words:
Highest Prob: protesta, vlasti, gradana, mujkic, protesti, politicari, gradani
FREX: mujkic, kim, asim, incko, politicari, demokratij, predsjednistvu
Lift: garnitura, inzka, mogucoj, naredna, nevjerovatno, predsjednistvu, subas
Score: agencijama, aktivno, aldin, alij, analizira, analizu, angazovanj

Topic 9 Top Words:
Highest Prob: sda, sigurnosti, radonc, ministra, radoncica, izetbegov, domu
FREX: sigurnosti, radoncica, ministra, domu, smjeni, radonc, smjenu
Lift: radoncicev, smijenjen, bevanda, davolom, elektroprenosu, formirao, glasal
Score: afirmiral, agencijama, akterima, aktivno, aldin, alij, alternativcima

Topic 10 Top Words:
Highest Prob: gradana, rsa, protesta, vlasti, protesti, borci, vlast

Appendix 6.5 Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina with territorial divisions: Republic of Srpska (RS) in white colour and the FB&H in the grey colour.

Appendix 6. 6 Top 20 countries with highest numbers of protest events based on the MMD dataset (1990-2014)



Appendix 6.7 Count of protest demands across protest size categories



Appendix 6.8 Count of government responses by protest size categories



Appendix 6.9 Robustness Checks. Multinomial Logit. *Government Responses:* ignore, accommodate, repress (baseline category). Inconsistency Response Additional Analyses.

	Government Response: ignore, accommodate, inconsistent, repress (baseline category)											
	ignore	accommodate	inconsistent	ignore	accommodate	inconsistent	ignore	accommodate	inconsistent	ignore	accommodate	inconsistent
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
100-999	0.181	0.440**	0.702**							0.180	0.449*	0.668**
	(0.119)	(0.223)	(0.298)							(0.135)	(0.234)	(0.299)
1000-1999	0.465***	0.699***	0.857***							0.441***	0.722***	0.894***
	(0.135)	(0.246)	(0.325)							(0.154)	(0.257)	(0.327)
2000-4999	0.583***	0.059	1.088***							0.595***	0.123	1.104***
	(0.150)	(0.313)	(0.339)							(0.171)	(0.325)	(0.341)
5000-10000	0.765***	0.604*	1.649***							0.530***	0.490	1.637***
	(0.184)	(0.336)	(0.359)							(0.203)	(0.350)	(0.363)
10001-100000	1.226***	1.418***	2.060***							1.052***	1.338***	1.987***
	(0.138)	(0.238)	(0.301)							(0.155)	(0.251)	(0.305)
> 100000	1.858***	2.240***	3.082***							1.499***	1.873***	3.022***
	(0.324)	(0.430)	(0.463)							(0.340)	(0.446)	(0.468)
Reform				0.134	-0.515***	0.481***				0.054	-0.587**	0.311
				(0.114)	(0.188)	(0.182)				(0.160)	(0.239)	(0.232)

Remove				0.359***	0.171	0.640***				0.145	-0.160	0.306
				(0.139)	(0.238)	(0.224)				(0.195)	(0.308)	(0.283)
Rights				-0.305**	-0.071	0.122				-0.162	-0.037	-0.013
				(0.135)	(0.230)	(0.244)				(0.182)	(0.285)	(0.300)
Production				0.179	0.549***	1.071***				0.150	0.607**	0.941***
				(0.116)	(0.192)	(0.182)				(0.162)	(0.244)	(0.234)
Protest violence							-2.563***	-2.169***	-0.056	-2.680***	-2.203***	0.005
							(0.087)	(0.169)	(0.122)	(0.113)	(0.214)	(0.152)
Non-Democracy	-0.380***	-0.903***	-0.444***	-0.421***	-0.891***	-0.415***	-0.547***	-1.019***	-0.522***	-0.534***	-1.032***	-0.410**
	(0.088)	(0.169)	(0.168)	(0.075)	(0.147)	(0.141)	(0.084)	(0.151)	(0.139)	(0.100)	(0.177)	(0.172)
Urban Population $_{log}$	-0.302***	-0.293***	-0.281***	-0.204***	-0.204***	-0.194***	-0.159***	-0.142***	-0.207***	-0.197***	-0.214***	-0.264***
	(0.026)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.052)
GDP per capita $_{log}$	0.404***	0.108	0.020	0.373***	0.145***	-0.050	0.194***	-0.030	-0.039	0.246***	-0.055	-0.039
	(0.042)	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.033)	(0.055)	(0.059)	(0.037)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.047)	(0.073)	(0.078)
Constant	-0.085	0.260	0.058	-0.394	-0.221	0.185	1.489***	1.198**	0.979*	0.861*	1.648**	-0.097
	(0.381)	(0.632)	(0.701)	(0.310)	(0.521)	(0.533)	(0.322)	(0.506)	(0.507)	(0.464)	(0.711)	(0.751)
N	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997
AIC	7,922.645	7,922.645	7,922.645	11,134.640	11,134.640	11,134.640	10,054.360	10,054.360	10,054.360	7,039.455	7,039.455	7,039.455

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix 6.10 Robustness Checks. Multinomial Logit. Ethnic Diversity.

Government Response: ignore, accommodate, inconsistent, repress (baseline category)

	ignore	accommodate	ignore	accommodate	ignore	accommodate	ignore	accommodate
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
100-999	0.195	0.421*					0.189	0.420*
	(0.119)	(0.224)					(0.136)	(0.235)
1000-1999	0.487***	0.704***					0.418***	0.678***
	(0.135)	(0.246)					(0.155)	(0.259)
2000-4999	0.599***	0.067					0.584***	0.104
	(0.150)	(0.313)					(0.173)	(0.325)
5000-10000	0.761***	0.604*					0.510**	0.457
	(0.185)	(0.337)					(0.205)	(0.351)
10001-100000	1.235***	1.425***					1.021***	1.313***
	(0.138)	(0.238)					(0.157)	(0.252)
> 100000	1.906***	2.234***					1.443***	1.748***
	(0.325)	(0.431)					(0.345)	(0.449)
Reform			0.142	-0.521***			0.045	-0.605**
			(0.115)	(0.188)			(0.163)	(0.241)
Remove			0.352**	0.188			0.144	-0.144
			(0.140)	(0.239)			(0.200)	(0.311)

Rights			-0.292**	-0.084			-0.140	-0.049
			(0.136)	(0.230)			(0.186)	(0.289)
Production			0.178	0.550***			0.120	0.579**
			(0.116)	(0.191)			(0.165)	(0.246)
Protest violence					-2.554***	-2.170***	-2.662***	-2.179***
					(0.087)	(0.170)	(0.113)	(0.215)
Ethnic Diversity (ED)	-0.311*	0.300	-0.407***	0.358	-0.327**	0.372	-0.290	0.387
	(0.177)	(0.300)	(0.144)	(0.256)	(0.163)	(0.263)	(0.200)	(0.318)
Non-Democracy	-0.389***	-0.913***	-0.414***	-0.911***	-0.537***	-1.026***	-0.553***	-1.051***
	(0.088)	(0.168)	(0.075)	(0.147)	(0.086)	(0.151)	(0.102)	(0.177)
Urban Population $_{log}$	-0.294***	-0.302***	-0.193***	-0.205***	-0.139***	-0.137***	-0.175***	-0.209***
	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.040)	(0.030)	(0.049)
GDP per capita $_{log}$	0.369***	0.146*	0.322***	0.182***	0.144***	-0.002	0.205***	-0.014
	(0.046)	(0.077)	(0.036)	(0.063)	(0.041)	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.083)
Constant	0.224	-0.087	0.060	-0.641	1.836***	0.773	1.126**	1.162
	(0.426)	(0.726)	(0.349)	(0.611)	(0.373)	(0.597)	(0.520)	(0.811)
N	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997	4997
AIC	6,077.144	6,077.144	8,533.347	8,533.347	7,577.228	7,577.228	5,323.690	5,323.690

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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